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PUSHING BACK ON STRICTER COPYRIGHT
ISP LIABILITY RULES
Pamela Samuelson*

Abstract
For more than two decades, internet service providers (ISPs) in
the United States, the European Union (EU), and many other countries
have been shielded from copyright liability under “safe harbor” rules.
These rules apply to ISPs who did not know about or participate in
user-uploaded infringements and who take infringing content down
after receiving notice from rights holders. Major copyright industry
groups were never satisfied with these safe harbors, and their
dissatisfaction has become more strident over time as online
infringements have grown to scale.
Responding to copyright industry complaints, the EU in 2019
adopted its Directive on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital
Single Market. In particular, the Directive’s Article 17 places much
stricter obligations on for-profit ISPs that host large amounts of user
contents. Article 17 is internally contradictory, deeply ambiguous, and
harmful to small and medium-sized companies as well as to user
freedoms of expression. Moreover, Article 17 may well violate the
European Charter of Fundamental Rights.
In the United States, Congress commenced a series of hearings in
2020 on the safe harbor rules now codified as 17 U.S.C. § 512 of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In May 2020, the U.S.
Copyright Office issued its long-awaited study on Section 512, which
recommended several significant changes to existing safe harbor rules.
The Study’s almost exclusively pro–copyright industry stances on
reform of virtually every aspect of the rules notably shortchanges other
stakeholder interests.
Congress should take a balanced approach in considering any
changes to the DMCA safe harbor rules. Any meaningful reform of ISP
*
Richard M. Sherman Distinguished Professor of Law, Berkeley Law School. This
Article is adapted from my written testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Intellectual
Property Subcommittee on March 10, 2020, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo
/media/doc/Samuelson%20Testimony.pdf. It has been substantially revised to comment on the
May 2020 Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study. I wish to thank Kathryn Hashimoto for excellent research support for that testimony and this Article, as well as Annemarie Bridy, Gwen
Hinze, Martin Husovec, Daphne Keller, Paul Keller, Corynne McSherry, João Pedro Quintais,
Julia Reda, Erik Stallman, and Rebecca Tushnet for their comments on drafts of my testimony
and/or this Article.
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liability rules should consider the interests of a wide range of
stakeholders. This includes U.S.-based Internet platforms, smaller and
medium-sized ISPs, startups, and the hundreds of millions of Internet
users who create and enjoy user-generated content (UGC) uploaded to
these platforms, as well as the interests of major copyright industries
and individual creators who have been dissatisfied with the DMCA
safe harbor rules.
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Introduction
For more than two decades, the United States and EU have had compatible “safe harbor” rules limiting the liability of internet service providers
(ISPs), such as Facebook and YouTube, that host content uploaded by their
users. As long as these ISPs were neither complicit in their users’ copyrightinfringing activities nor aware that user-uploaded content was infringing,
the safe harbor rules relieved them from liability for user infringements.
Under these rules, ISPs would become liable for user infringement if they
failed to remove or disable access to infringing materials after receiving detailed notices from copyright owners or their agents about the location of
specific infringing materials. In the United States, this “notice-andtakedown” regime was adopted as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright
1
Act (DMCA) of 1998. In the EU, this was accomplished as part of its Di2
rective on E-Commerce in 2000. Many other countries have followed the
3
U.S.-and-EU-led approach to ISP liability.
Major copyright industry groups would have preferred stronger ISP lia4
bility rules in national laws back in the late 1990s and early 2000s. But
they reluctantly went along with the safe harbor rules as part of legislative
5
compromises about updating copyright rules for the digital age. Over time,
the scale and scope of online copyright-related activity, both legitimate (for
example, user-generated content such as remix parodies) and illegitimate
(online piracy), has far surpassed what policymakers in the United States
and EU could have imagined. Although ISPs have sometimes been held in6
directly liable for contributing to user infringement, the safe harbor rules
1.
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Title II of Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 201–02, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877 (1998) (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512).
2.
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic
Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive].
3.
See, e.g., Copyright Law in Foreign Jurisdictions: How Are Other Countries Handling Digital Piracy?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1–2 (2020) [hereinafter Copyright in Foreign Jurisdictions Hearing] (statement of Justin Hughes, Professor of Law, Loyola Marymount University); id. at 4
(statement of Matt Schruers, President, Computer & Communications Industry Association).
4.
See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 135 (2006) (describing content owner
groups as favoring strict liability rules against ISPs). The long, complicated bargaining process leading to passage of the DMCA is recounted in detail by Professor Litman. See id. at
122–45.
5.
See id. at 135 (“It soon became clear to content owners, however, that the legislation could not move without a solution to the problem of Internet service provider liability.”).
6.
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–
30 (2005) (holding peer-to-peer file-sharing service liable for inducing user infringements).
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have protected ISPs even when they were generally aware of some user in7
fringement on their sites. Dissatisfaction with the safe harbors has caused
copyright industry groups and some individual creators to urge legislators to
8
stiffen the existing rules.
Copyright industry complaints about online piracy contributed to the
European Commission’s 2016 decision to propose a new directive that,
among other things, would place much stricter obligations on for-profit ISPs
9
that host large amounts of user content, even if these sites host lawful usergenerated content (UGC). The Commission hoped these new rules would
induce ISPs to engage in more licensing of EU copyrights and reduce useruploaded infringements by creating incentives for these ISPs to adopt auto10
mated content recognition tools. In April 2019, the EU finalized its Directive on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market (DSM
11
Directive). The revised and renumbered Article 17 directs EU member
states to adopt strict liability rules for a subset of ISPs referred to in the di12
rective as “online content-sharing service providers.” Under the new rules,
these services will be directly liable for any infringing files that users upload
to their sites. The services must make “best efforts” to obtain licenses from
copyright owners and to ensure that protected works for which copyright
owners have provided relevant information cannot be uploaded to the service’s sites; moreover, the services must make best efforts to keep the materials from being reuploaded after they are taken down. (This is commonly
13
referred to as a “notice-and-staydown” procedure.) Article 17 was highly

7.
See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 32–33 (2d Cir. 2012)
(hosting service not liable for infringing uploads of users despite general knowledge of some
infringements on its site).
8.
See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren et al., Is It Time to Abolish Safe Harbor? When Rhetoric Clouds Policy Goals, 31 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 10 (2020).
9.
Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Proposed DSM Directive]. The Proposed DSM Directive largely ignored that a substantial proportion of user-uploaded content hosted by ISPs is UGC. See discussion of UGC infra
notes 76–77, 193–203 and accompanying text.
10.
See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”: How the Music
Industry Hacked EU Copyright Reform, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 323, 326–33 (2020)
(explaining and critiquing the “value gap” rationale for the adoption of Article 17).
11.
Council Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
17 April 2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market, 2019 O.J. (L
130) [hereinafter DSM Directive]. My focus in this Article is on the copyright implications of
Article 17; the rules it establishes also apply to the online hosting of contents that are subject
to related rights protections (such as the exclusive rights EU law provides in broadcasts and
sound recordings) and sui generis database rights.
12.
Id. art. 2(6) (defining this term).
13.
Id. art. 17(4). For an excellent comparative analysis of notice-and-takedown and
notice-and-staydown regimes, see Martin Husovec, The Promises of Algorithmic Copyright
Enforcement: Takedown or Staydown? Which is Superior? And Why?, 42 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 53 (2018).
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controversial in the EU, barely garnering a majority vote in support at the
EU Parliament, even after adoption of key amendments to protect user interests to address critics’ concerns. EU member states have until June 2021
to transpose Article 17 into their national laws.
Copyright industry criticisms of the DMCA safe harbors also contributed to the U.S. Copyright Office’s decision in late 2015 to initiate a policy
14
study of these rules. In May 2020, the Office published a study recommending several significant changes to these rules, although it did not endorse an Article 17-like notice-and-staydown regime, as some copyright in15
dustry representatives had urged. Even before the Office’s Study became
public, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Intellectual Property Subcommit16
tee commenced a series of hearings about the DMCA safe harbors. On
March 10, this Subcommittee heard from two panels of experts on how other jurisdictions are dealing with online piracy. My testimony at this hearing
explained why Article 17 of the DSM Directive should not serve as a model
17
for any Congressional reconsideration of the DMCA safe harbors.

14.
See Section 512 Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 80 Fed. Reg.
81862, 81862 (Dec. 31, 2015). Following two Notices of Inquiry that sought public comments
and several public roundtables, the Office issued its Report. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 1 (May 2020) [hereinafter SECTION 512 STUDY].
15.
See SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 186–93; see, e.g., U.S. Copyright Office, Transcript, Section 512 Study Roundtable (Apr. 8, 2019) (comments of Mary Rasenberger, Authors Guild; and Eric Cady, Independent Film and Television Alliance),
https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/public-roundtable/transcript_04-08-2019.pdf
(urging adoption of notice-and-staydown rules).
16.
See, e.g., Eileen McDermott, Senate IP Subcommittee Kicks Off Year-Long Review
of Digital Millennium Copyright Act, IP WATCHDOG (Feb. 13, 2020),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/02/13/senate-ip-subcommittee-kicks-off-year-longreview-digital-millennium-copyright-act/id=118866. The first hearing was held on February
11, 2020. See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act at 22: What Is It, Why Was It Enacted,
and Where Are We Now?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020) [hereinafter DMCA at 22 Hearing]. On June 2,
2020, a third hearing occurred. See Is the DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown System Working in
the 21st Century?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020) [hereinafter DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing]. These
were followed by two more Senate hearings held on July 28, 2020 and December 15, 2020,
respectively. See How Does the DMCA Contemplate Limitations and Exceptions Like Fair
Use?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th
Cong. (2020); The Role of Private Agreements and Existing Technology in Curbing Online
Piracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
116th Cong. (2020). The House also held a hearing after the Copyright Office issued its § 512
Report. See Copyright and the Internet in 2020: Reactions to the Copyright Office’s Report on
the Efficacy of 17 U.S.C. § 512 After Two Decades: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020).
17.
Copyright in Foreign Jurisdictions Hearing, supra note 3 (statement of Pamela
Samuelson, Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley). On December 22, 2020,
Sen. Thom Tillis, then-Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, released the first discussion draft of legislation to reform the DMCA, soliciting
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This Article revisits and expands upon key points from that testimony
and offers a critique of the Copyright Office’s recently issued Section 512
Study. Part I reviews the circumstances that led to the creation of these safe
harbors and the role the United States has played in making the notice-andtakedown regime an international standard. Part II shows that Article 17 of
the DSM is internally contradictory, deeply ambiguous, and harmful to
small and medium-sized companies as well as to user freedoms of expression. It also discusses why Article 17 may well violate the European Charter
of Fundamental Rights.
Part III recommends that Congress take a balanced approach in considering any changes to the DMCA notice-and-takedown rules. It critiques key
recommendations for changes to the DMCA safe harbors in the Copyright
Office’s Section 512 Study. Any meaningful reform of ISP liability rules
should consider the interests of a wide range of stakeholders, including
highly successful U.S.-based internet platforms, smaller and medium-sized
ISPs, startups, the many millions of internet users who share their own creations through these platforms, hundreds of millions of internet users who
enjoy these creations, as well as the interests of major copyright industries
and individual creators who have been dissatisfied with the DMCA safe
harbor rules. The Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study purports to take a
comprehensive and balanced view in presenting its analysis and recommendations, but on closer reading its almost exclusively pro–copyright industry
stances on reform of virtually every aspect of § 512 shortchanges several
other types of stakeholder interests. The Office does not even recognize that
UGC creators are copyright owners too, whose interests may be adversely
affected by numerous changes the Section 512 Study would make to ISP liability rules.

I. ISP Safe Harbors for User Infringements Became an
International Norm After Adoption of the WCT
In the mid-1990s, when the internet was much less widely used than it
is today, stakeholders and policymakers engaged in long and complex negotiations to consider the future of copyright law in the digital environment.
One contentious issue was what, if any, legal liability ISPs should incur for
copyright-infringing content posted by their users. Prior to the diplomatic
conference that culminated in the adoption of the WIPO Copyright Treaty
(WCT), the Clinton Administration published its White Paper on Intellectu-

comments from stakeholders and interested parties by March 5, 2021. See Press Release, Sen.
Thom Tillis, Tillis Releases Landmark Discussion Draft to Reform the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2020/12/tillis-releases-landmarkdiscussion-draft-to-reform-the-digital-millennium-copyright-act. Analysis of this discussion
draft is, unfortunately, beyond the scope and time constraints of this Article.
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al Property and the National Information Infrastructure stating that ISPs
were and should be liable for user infringements on their sites, a position
18
with which ISPs took issue. U.S. officials also proposed this rule for consideration at the WIPO diplomatic conference scheduled in late 1996 to
19
consider a possible treaty on digital copyright issues. The strict liability
position initially proposed by the United States was not met with favor
among the delegates to the diplomatic conference, however, because it was
unbalanced and unfair to ISPs insofar as they were unaware of infringing
20
materials on their sites.
21
An Agreed Statement to Article 8 of the WCT became the international norm regarding ISP liability for user infringements of which the ISPs
were unaware and over which they had no control. It stated that “the mere
provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication
does not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Trea22
ty or the Berne Convention.” Consistent with this position were subsequent legislative limitations on ISPs’ liability for infringing acts of their users about which they lacked knowledge and over which they had no control.
The United States implemented this norm as part of the DMCA in 1998,
creating a new § 512 of U.S. copyright law to establish four ISP safe har23
bors from monetary and injunctive relief. The U.S. legislative debate over
ISP liability rules was influenced by a court ruling in Religious Technology
24
Center v. Netcom Online Communication Services, Inc. It held that an in18.
BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 117 (1995).
19.
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Big Media Beaten Back, WIRED (Mar. 01, 1997,
12:00 PM) [hereinafter Samuelson, Big Media], https://www.wired.com/1997/03/netizen-4.
For a fuller discussion about the differences between the proposed and final treaties on digital
copyright law, see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J.
INT’L L. 369, 370 (1997) [hereinafter Samuelson, U.S. Digital Agenda].
20.
See, e.g., Samuelson, U.S. Digital Agenda, supra note 19, at 387–88.
21.
World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Agreed Statement Concerning
the WIPO Copyright Treaty, at 3, CRNR/DC/96 (Dec. 23, 1996), https://www.wipo.int
/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=2464.
22.
Id.
23.
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Title II of Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 201–02, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877 (1998) (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512); see, e.g., Jesse Helms, WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATY AND
WIPO PERFORMANCES AND PHONOGRAMS TREATY REPORT TO ACCOMPANY TREATY DOC.
106-17, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 105-25, at 17 (2d Sess. 1998) (referring to the compromise on ISP
liability at WIPO diplomatic conference that resulted in the Agreed Statement and provisions
in implementing legislation that set forth “a clear legal framework for rights and responsibilities of ISPs, telephone companies, and copyright holders”). In the United States, ISPs are immune from liability for other tortious acts by users under 47 U.S.C. § 230. See, e.g., JEFF
KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET 9–10 (2019).
24.
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc’n Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1995), cited in H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 11 (1998) (“Thus, the bill essentially
codifies the result in the leading and most thoughtful judicial decision to date [i.e., Netcom].”).
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ternet access provider, Netcom, was not directly liable for a subscriber’s in25
fringement of which it was unaware. Regarding secondary liability, specifically contributory liability, however, the court thought that once RTC notified Netcom about the presence of infringing content on its network,
Netcom had a duty to investigate and take down infringing materials if the
claim was valid. The court thus denied Netcom’s motion for summary
judgment, ruling that Netcom could be held contributorily liable for subscriber infringements if its failure to act on RTC’s notice materially contrib26
uted to the subscriber’s infringement.
In keeping with the Netcom decision, the first safe harbor in § 512 exempts internet access providers from liability for unmodified transitory digi27
tal network communications. The second limits ISP liability for network
28
system caching. The third limits liability for ISP storage of contents at the
29
direction of the system’s users. The fourth provides a safe harbor to information locating tools, such as search engines, that may link or refer to in30
fringing materials. The latter three safe harbors are subject to notice-andtakedown rules under which ISPs are obliged, after receiving specific notices from copyright owners or their agents about the location of specific in31
fringing materials, to remove or disable access to those materials.
Eligibility for the § 512 safe harbors is subject to certain conditions.
One is that ISPs must adopt and reasonably implement a policy for terminating the accounts of repeat infringers in appropriate circumstances. Another
is that ISPs must inform the Copyright Office of the agent the ISPs have
designated to be the recipients of infringement takedown notices in order to
32
be eligible for the § 512(b), (c), and (d) safe harbors.
Among the significant safeguards in § 512 for ISPs and their users is
§ 512(m), which clarifies that ISPs do not have a duty to monitor for or affirmatively seek out facts about possible infringing activities. This rule protects users’ privacy as well as limiting the extent to which ISPs have to be

25.
Id. at 1369–70.
26.
Id. at 1381.
27.
17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
28.
Id. § 512(b).
29.
Id. § 512(c).
30.
Id. § 512(d).
31.
Id. § 512(b)(2)(E), (c)(1)(C), (d)(3).
32.
Id. § 512(c)(2)–(3), 512(i)(1)(A). The designated agent requirement appears to be
incorporated in § 512(b) and (d) by reference to § 512(c)(3). Subsection (i) also conditions
safe harbors on the ISP’s accommodation of standard technical measures. See id. § 512(i)(1)–
(2). This condition has yet to be activated because there has been no stakeholder consensus
about standard technical measures. The Copyright Office intends to initiate discussions with
stakeholders in an effort to build consensus on such measures in coming years. See SECTION
512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 176–80.
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33

on the lookout for infringements. Two further user safeguards are § 512(f),
which provides a compensatory remedy for users victimized by wrongful
takedowns, and § 512(g), which obligates ISPs to notify users of takedowns
done in response to copyright owner demands and establishes a counterno34
tice procedure if users want to contest a copyright infringement claim.
The EU adopted a similar set of safe harbors in 2000 through adoption
35
of Articles 12 through 15 of its E-Commerce Directive. Numerous other
countries have followed the United States’ and EU’s leads in adopting simi36
lar safe harbor rules in their national laws. Even without legislation, courts
in some countries have interpreted their national copyright laws in a manner
37
consistent with the DMCA safe harbors.
The United States has, moreover, exported DMCA-like ISP safe harbor
rules through its Free Trade Agreements with numerous nations in Asia, the
38
Middle East, and South America. The most recent example is the United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which updated the North

33.
17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1). However, “red flag” knowledge of infringement will defeat
eligibility for § 512(c)’s safe harbor. See infra notes 154–57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the § 512 “red flag” knowledge rule.
34.
17 U.S.C. § 512(f), (g).
35.
E-Commerce Directive, supra note 2. Article 12 is similar to the § 512(a) safe harbor; Article 13 is similar to the § 512(b) safe harbor, and Article 14 is similar to § 512(c). The
E-Commerce Directive does not have safe harbor for search engines or other information locating tools. Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive established a no-general-obligation-tomonitor rule. Under the E-Commerce Directive, ISPs are subject to the same notice and
takedown obligations for tortious acts of their users. Id.
36.
See, e.g., Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473, 477 (2016) (describing notice and takedown
regimes as “ubiquitous and embedded in the system design of all major intermediaries”). For a
country-by-country account of laws governing online intermediaries, see Stanford Law School
Center for Internet and Society, World Intermediary Liability Map (WILMap), CTR. FOR
INTERNET & SOC’Y, https://wilmap.law.stanford.edu; see also Daphne Keller, Build Your
Own Intermediary Liability Law: A Kit for Policy Wonks of All Ages, CTR. FOR INTERNET &
SOC’Y (June 11, 2019), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/publications/build-your-ownintermediary-liability-law-kit-policy-wonks-all-ages.
37.
See, e.g., Joan Barata, Court Holds That Users’ Uploading, Storing, and Downloading Activities Do Not in Themselves Constitute Dissemination of Information, CTR. FOR
INTERNET & SOC’Y (June 11, 2019), https://wilmap.law.stanford.edu/entries/court-holdsusers-uploading-storing-and-downloading-activities-do-not-themselves-constitute (reporting
on Sohu v. Baidu decision by Singapore court).
38.
See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Between Morocco and the United States
(MUSFTA), CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (June 15, 2004), https://wilmap.law.stanford.edu
/entries/free-trade-agreement-fta-between-morocco-and-united-sates-musfta; see SECTION 512
STUDY, supra note 14, at 50–51 n.269; see also Gwenith Hinze, A Tale of Two Legal Regimes: An Empirical Investigation into How Copyright Law Shapes Online Service Providers’
Practices and How Online Service Providers Navigate Differences in US and EU Copyright
Liability 153–54 (Spring 2019) (S.J.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on
file with UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations).
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and includes a DMCA-like ISP
39
safe harbor provision.
Some countries have adopted less strict ISP liability rules than the
DMCA notice-and-takedown regime. Canada, for instance, has adopted a
40
“notice-and-notice” regime to deal with user infringements. As with the
DMCA takedown safe harbors, the first step of the notice-and-notice procedure directs copyright owners to notify an ISP when they have detected the
presence and location on the ISP’s site of digital contents in which they own
rights and in which they have a good faith belief the contents are infring41
ing. The second step calls for the ISP to forward this notice to its subscriber, thereby alerting that person that its internet account was linked to an alleged infringement. Beyond this, neither the ISP nor the subscriber has a
statutory obligation to take down any content from the ISP’s site, although a
failure to take down infringing contents may result in the subscriber being
42
liable in money damages for the infringement. The stated goal of the notice-and-notice regime is to discourage infringement and raise internet us43
ers’ awareness about copyrights. Canada has decided to maintain its notice-and-notice ISP regulations, even though these rules are less strict than
44
the DMCA and the USMCA provisions.
Major content industry groups were never supportive of DMCA-like
notice-and-takedown safe harbors. These groups have become ever more
dissatisfied with the safe harbors over time because the number of online
45
infringements has become staggeringly large. The entertainment industry

39.
See, e.g., Ross Bagley, USMCA Set to Export U.S. Copyright Law to North American Neighbors, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/01/29
/usmca-set-export-u-s-copyright-law-north-american-neighbors/id=118269.
40.
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42 §§ 41.25, 41.26 (Can.). Some countries do not
require ISPs to take down infringing materials without a court order. See Copyright in Foreign
Jurisdictions Hearing, supra note 3, at 5 (statement of Daphne Keller, Professor of Law, Stanford University).
41.
The process is explained on a Government of Canada website. See Notice and Notice Regime, GOV’T OF CANADA, https://ic.gc.ca/eic/site/oca-bc.nsf/eng/ca02920.html.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. In December 2018, the Canadian Parliament amended the Copyright Act to clarify that notices of user infringement sent to ISPs should not include a demand for payment or
an offer to settle a claim of infringement, as this is incompatible with the notice-and-notice
regime. Id. The U.S. Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study incorrectly stated that Canadian
notices could ask for license payments. SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 52.
44.
See, e.g., Michael Geist, USMCA Sends Canada Back to the Drawing Board on
Copyright Law, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/usmca-sends-canada-back-drawing-board-copyright-law.
45.
See, e.g., SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 77–83. The Copyright Office has
one-sidedly accepted anecdotal evidence from copyright industry groups on harms from copyright infringement while discounting evidence from ISPs about the scale and repercussions of
takedown abuses. Compare id. at 78, with id. at 147 (accepting copyright owners’ reliance on
data from Google’s Transparency Report on the substantial number of takedown requests to
support the claim that “the system is not working,” but dismissing ISPs’ reliance on an empir-
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46

has tested the boundaries of the DMCA safe harbors through litigation.
While they have not won all of the lawsuits filed, they have achieved notable successes against peer-to-peer file-sharing firms and providers of torrent
47
files who induced copyright infringement. Also notable was a $1 billion
jury award against Cox Communications for being willfully blind to copy48
right infringement by its users. Failure to adopt or enforce repeat infringer
policies can result in an ISP losing DMCA safe harbor protections, exposing
49
it to copyright liability. Several major copyright industry lawsuits against
ISPs are pending under secondary liability theories asserting, among other
things, that the ISPs failed to respond adequately to claims that their users’
50
activities were infringing. The high costs of defending lawsuits and the potential for gargantuan statutory damage awards has had an additional
51
chilling effect on the development and deployment of online platforms.
Under pressure from major copyright industry groups, very large platforms such as YouTube and Facebook have developed or licensed automated content recognition technologies that enable the detection of copyrighted
files at the time of user uploads. Copyright owners can choose whether to

ical study from the Lumen database to support ISP claims on the extent of inappropriate notices).
46.
See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (rejecting
Viacom’s claim that an ISP’s general awareness of infringing user-uploaded content constitutes “red flag” knowledge of infringement); see also SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14,
Part VI (extensively discussing the § 512 case law).
47.
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005); in re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d
1020 (9th Cir. 2013).
48.
See Erik Pedersen, Cox Communications Hit with Billion-Dollar Judgment in Music Copyright Suit, DEADLINE (Dec. 19, 2019), https://deadline.com/2019/12/coxcommunications-music-copyright-lawsuit-billion-dollar-judgment-music-labels-1202814269.
The jury’s damages award was subsequently upheld. Sony Music Entm’t v. Cox Commc’ns,
Inc., 464 F. Supp. 3d 795 (E.D. Va. 2020).
49.
See, e.g., BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 881 F.3d 293,
299, 304–05 (4th Cir. 2018). The Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study is highly critical of
court decisions that, in its view, have given ISPs too much discretion in fashioning repeat infringer policies. See SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 95–109; infra text accompanying
note 161–64.
50.
See, e.g., J. Alexander Lawrence, Will the Music Industry Continue to Win Its Copyright Battle Against ISPs?, SOCIALLY AWARE (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.socially
awareblog.com/2019/11/07/will-the-music-industry-continue-to-win-its-copyright-battleagainst-isps.
51.
See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012
WIS. L. REV. 891, 937, 940 (2012). U.S. copyright law allows rights holders to opt for statutory damages of no less than $750 and up to $30,000 per infringed work, which can be increased to up to $150,000 per infringed work if the infringement is willful. 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c).
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allow YouTube to enable these uploads subject to revenue sharing or to
52
block infringing uploads.
Because many sites that provide access to infringing materials are offshore, copyright industry groups strongly supported the Stop Online Piracy
Act (SOPA) and PROTECT IP Act (PIPA), which would have enabled copyright owners to obtain injunctions requiring U.S.-based ISPs and payment
53
processors to block offshore “rogue” websites. After strong public opposi54
tion arose to SOPA and PIPA, these bills failed in Congress. Private initiatives with payment processors have alleviated some problems that the copy55
right industries have with these offshore sites. However, copyright
industry groups believe these and other private initiatives do not go far
enough. They want new legislation to put more responsibility on ISPs to
thwart infringements.

52.
See, e.g., Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 36, at 512; see also Katherine Oyama,
Continuing to Create Value While Fighting Piracy: An Update, GOOGLE (July 13, 2016),
https://blog.google/outreach-initiatives/public-policy/continuing-to-create-value-while
(reporting that more than 90 percent of Content ID claims result in monetization for copyright
owners).
53.
Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); PROTECT IP Act of
2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011); see, e.g., Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice: From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 203, 220–26
(2013) (discussing SOPA and PIPA legislative controversy).
54.
Lev-Aretz, supra note 53, at 204–05. Copyright industry representatives have expressed renewed interest in site-blocking injunctions. See, e.g., Copyright in Foreign Jurisdictions Hearing, supra note 3 (statement of Stan McCoy, President and Managing Director, Motion Picture Association). The Copyright Office considered, but did not recommend,
Congressional authorization of site-blocking injunctions. See SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note
14, at 193–96. Courts have in the past refused to grant injunctive relief against defendants unless they have been found to have engaged in copyright infringement. See, e.g., Bryant v.
Gordon, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1066 (N.D. Ill. 2007); see also Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
Carol Publ’g Grp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 372, 374, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (refusing to issue an injunction against nonparty distributors of copies of infringing books); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §14.06 [C][2][b] (rev. ed. 2019). Congress may not
be able to authorize no-fault site-blocking injunctions, for this may be beyond the equitable
powers of courts. See, e.g., Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 398–
402 (1982) (holding that injunctive relief is not available against an entity that had not violated the law).
55.
Litigation against payment processors as indirect infringers of copyrights failed in
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007). However, negotiations
between copyright industry groups and payment processors led to the development of best
practices. See Payment Processor Best Practices for Online Copyright Infringement: What It
Means for Musicians, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION (Oct. 24, 2011),
https://futureofmusic.org/article/article/payment-processor-best-practices-online-copyrightinfringement.
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II. Article 17 of the EU’s DSM Directive Is a Deeply Flawed
Model for Regulating ISPs That Host User-Uploaded Content
An opportunity to press for stronger legislative regulation of ISPs arose
when the European Union undertook its proposed Directive on Copyright
56
and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market. The proposed Directive
was hugely controversial in the EU, largely because of its Article 13 (now
Article 17) strict liability rule for certain ISPs that host user-uploaded con57
tent.
More than 145 civil society organizations opposed the adoption of the
58
precursor to Article 17. More than five million individuals signed a peti59
tion against it. Many European scholars criticized the proposed provision
because, among other things, this new strict liability regime would undermine fundamental freedoms of expression and access to knowledge and cul60
ture. A coalition of 240 EU-based online businesses wrote a letter asking
members of the EU Parliament to reject this strict liability rule because
small and medium-sized enterprises would suffer undue financial and operational burdens if forced to develop or utilize automated content recognition
61
tools and because current technologies are too inaccurate.
56.
See Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 9 (providing in Article 13 that “information society service providers storing and giving access to large amounts of works and other subject-matter uploaded by their users” would be strictly liable for user uploads that infringed copyrights).
57.
For a range of critical perspectives on the proposed strict liability rule, see Article
13 Research: Studies, Opinions and Sources of Data, CREATE, https://www.create.ac.uk
/policy-responses/eu-copyright-reform/article-13-research (last visited Mar. 07, 2021). The
European Commission initially tried to justify this new regulation by claiming it was consistent with existing EU law, which some scholars contested. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 10,
at 333–46.
58.
See Open Letter to Member of the European Parliament (July 2018),
https://copybuzz.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Copyright-Open-Letter-on-EP-PlenaryVote-on-Negotiation-Mandate.pdf. Later signatories brought the final total to 167 organizations opposed to Article 13.
59.
See SAVE THE INTERNET, https://www.savetheinternet.info (last visited Mar. 07,
2021).
60.
See, e.g., Christina Angelopoulos, On Online Platforms and the Commission’s New
Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (Jan. 2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947800) (concluding that the proposed Article 13 of
the DSM Directive was incompatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, as
interpreted by the Court of Justice of the EU); see also David Kaye, Mandate of the Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 7–8, U.N. Doc. OL OTH 41/2018 (June 13, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents
/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL-OTH-41-2018.pdf (raising specific concerns and concluding
that he was “very seriously concerned that the proposed Directive would establish a regime of
active monitoring and prior censorship of user-generated content that is inconsistent with Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.”).
61.
E.g., Jos Poortvliet, 240 EU Businesses Sign Open Letter Against Copyright Directive Art. 11 & 13, NEXTCLOUD (Mar. 19, 2019), https://nextcloud.com/blog/130-eubusinesses-sign-open-letter-against-copyright-directive-art-11-13.
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These criticisms from multiple sectors sufficiently resonated with EU
policymakers to persuade them to amend the Directive to add numerous
limitations on the liability rules of what became Article 17 of the DSM Di62
rective. Without the numerous concessions aimed at addressing concerns
raised by the critics, the DSM Directive would likely have failed in the final
EU Parliament vote, as it just barely garnered a majority when put to a
63
64
vote. The much-amended DSM Directive became final in April 2019.
Member states have until June 2021 to implement the Directive in their national copyright laws, but only one country has thus far transposed Article
17 into its national law. Clearly, the controversy over Article 17 is far from
65
over.
Before discussing the many flaws of DSM Directive Article 17, it is
important to understand its core norm. Article 17 directs member states of
the EU to pass legislation with regard to for-profit online content sharing
services that provide public access to large amounts of user-uploaded content. EU member states must make these services directly liable for communicating to the public any infringing copies uploaded by their users unless the services have obtained, or made best efforts to obtain, licenses from
rights holders. These services must also ensure the unavailability of specific
works on their sites for which rights holders have provided relevant infor66
mation (such as a digital fingerprint). Under such legislation, online content sharing services must also act expeditiously to disable access or remove

62.
See Bridy, supra note 10, 351–57 (discussing differences between proposed Article
13 and the adopted Article 17); see also infra Part II.A.
63.
Article 13 (now 17) survived a last-minute bid for its removal by only five votes.
See James Vincent, Europe’s Controversial Overhaul of Online Copyright Receives Final Approval, VERGE (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/26/18280726/europecopyright-directive; see also João Pedro Quintais, The New Copyright in the Digital Single
Market Directive: A Critical Look, 42 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 28 (2020). Some scholars
have a more positive view of Article 17. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, A United States Perspective on Digital Single Market Directive Art. 17 (Colum. L. Sch. Working Paper, Paper No. 14654, 2020), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3682&context=
faculty_scholarship.
64.
DSM Directive, supra note 11; see SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 61–63
(discussing Article 17). The Copyright Office Study did not discuss the user freedom protections that Article 17 aims to preserve.
65.
See, e.g., Paul Keller, Article 17 Stakeholder Dialogue (Day 6), COMMUNIA (Feb.
13,
2020),
https://www.communia-association.org/2020/02/13/article-17-stakeholderdialogue-day-6-hitting-brick-wall. Thirteen IP scholars are signatories to the European Copyright Society’s recommendations for implementing Article 17 in national laws in a manner
that provides a pragmatic and balanced approach. Axel Metzger & Martin Senftleben, Comment of the European Copyright Society on Selected Aspects of Implementing Article 17 of the
Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market into National Law, EUR. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y (Apr. 27, 2020), https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.files.wordpress.com/2020/04
/ecs-comment-article-17-cdsm.pdf.
66.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(1), (4).
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infringing copies after receiving notice of infringement from rights holders
67
and must use best efforts to prevent future uploads.
My criticisms of Article 17 are set forth in the remainder of this Part.
Section A explains that because of several amendments that partially limited
its scope, Article 17 is more balanced than its precursor in the proposed
DSM Directive. Section B explains that several of these changes have made
Article 17 internally inconsistent. Section C discusses ambiguities in Article
17 that will make it difficult for profit-making ISPs who host user content to
predict whether they will be subject to Article 17’s strictures or remain
within the much less strict notice-and-takedown regime that has prevailed
for the past two decades. Section D suggests that small and medium-sized
platforms are unlikely to achieve either the licensing or preventive measures
obligations established by Article 17. Section E considers the Polish government’s challenge to Article 17 under the European Charter of Fundamental Rights as that Charter has been interpreted by the Court of Justice of the
EU (CJEU).

A. Internal Limits to Article 17 That Respond to Earlier Criticisms
In response to intense criticisms of Article 17’s precursor in the proposed DSM Directive, EU policymakers made several changes that limit the
scope of Article 17. Without these changes, the DSM Directive would not
have garnered enough political support to be adopted. Some of these limits
are more significant than others. It is noteworthy, however, that Article 17
implicitly retains the E-Commerce Directive’s safe harbors for ISPs that do
not fall within the DSM definition of online content sharing services. In
other words, ISPs that do not host “large” amounts of user-uploaded content
or do not organize and promote user-uploaded content, but merely store
some such content, along with internet access providers, are exempt from
the reach of Article 17, although they remain subject to the notice-and68
takedown rules of the E-Commerce Directive.
One of the most significant changes to Article 17 is that it does not apply at all to nonprofit online encyclopedias, educational and scientific repositories, and open source software developing and sharing sites. Also excluded are providers of electronic communication services, online marketplaces,
business-to-business cloud services, and cloud services that allow users to
69
upload content for their own use. These exclusions recognize that the no67.
Id. art. 17(4).
68.
See id. art. 2(6). The EU is, however, moving ahead with new strict ISP notice-andtakedown regulations for terrorist content. See, e.g., Colin Lecher, Aggressive New Terrorist
Content Regulation Passes EU Vote, VERGE (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019
/4/17/18412278/eu-terrorist-content-law-parliament-takedown. In addition, the EU is contemplating a review and revision of the E-Commerce Directive, which governs ISPs that are outside the reach of Article 17. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
69.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 2(6).
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tice-and-takedown regime is working well enough to preserve safe harbors
for these types of online services. It also implicitly recognizes that Article
17 has the potential to be unduly burdensome for entities that do not pose
the high risks of infringement that Article 17 was intended to address. The
strict liability rule in the proposed DSM Directive had no such exclusions. It
would have applied to all ISPs that enable members of the public to have
70
access to “large” amounts of content uploaded by users.
Much less significant is the Article 17 provision that lessens the responsibilities of startup online content sharing sites towards rights holders. It applies to companies that are less than three years old if they have an annual
turnover below ten million euros. These startup service providers must still
make “best efforts” to obtain licenses and to disable access or remove in71
fringing content expeditiously after receiving notice. If the average number of unique monthly visitors exceeds five million, startups will bear an extra burden of “best efforts” to prevent further uploads of infringing
72
materials. This is such a narrow safe harbor that very few, if any, ISPs will
be able to benefit from it.
Among the most significant limits in Article 17 are a trio of provisions
aimed at protecting user freedoms. One states that Article 17 “shall in no
way affect legitimate uses [of copyrighted works], such as uses under ex73
ceptions and limitations” under EU law. A second mandates that cooperation between rights holders and online content sites “shall not result in the
prevention of the availability of works or other subject matter uploaded by
users, which do not infringe copyright and related rights, including where
such works or other subject matter are covered by an exception or limita74
tion.” A third explicitly requires member states to ensure that users can rely on copyright exceptions that enable quotation, criticism, and review as
75
well as caricature, parody, or pastiche.
These provisions of the DSM Directive implicitly recognize that many
online content sites host significant quantities of user-generated works, such
as remixes and mashups, that are lawful as a matter of EU copyright law
76
under the quotation or parody exceptions. There was no counterpart to

70.
Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 9, art. 13(1).
71.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(6).
72.
Id.
73.
Id. art. 17(9). See Bridy, supra note 10, at 345–47 (discussing user freedom issues).
74.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(7).
75.
Id. But see infra note 129 and accompanying text (French and Dutch proposals for
implementing Article 17 omit user rights provisions).
76.
The adoption of Article 17(7) means that the quotation and parody exceptions are
now mandatory throughout the EU, even if member states had not previously adopted them.
See, e.g., João Pedro Quintais et al., Safeguarding User Freedoms in Implementing Article 17
of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: Recommendations from European
Academics, 10 (3) JIPITEC 277 ¶ 10-13 (2019), https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-10-32019/5042. In keeping with the CJEU’s Deckmyn decision, these exceptions are likely to have
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these provisions in the initially proposed DSM Directive, which the Commission at the time said would have only a “limited impact” on freedom of
77
expression and information. The user freedom–related revisions to Article
17 reflect the Commission’s acceptance that the new strict liability rules
pose a much greater risk to fundamental rights than it previously acknowledged.
In addition, Article 17 requires member states to ensure that online content sharing sites put in place an “effective and expeditious complaint and
redress mechanism” for users to dispute the removal or disabling of access
78
to uploaded contents. This is a further acknowledgement of the risks that
Article 17 poses for the ability of users to exercise their right to freedom of
expression under exceptions and limitations. When users do contest
takedowns, rights holders must justify their assertions that the exceptions or
79
limitations do not apply; human review of the disputed content is required.
80
Users are additionally entitled to seek judicial review of their claims. The
initial version of the DSM Directive made a general statement about the
81
need for service providers to provide complaint and redress mechanisms,
but Article 17 is much more detailed about what is required.
The DSM Directive also expressly declares that Article 17 does not cre82
ate a general monitoring obligation on online content sharing sites. This is
in stark contrast to the initially proposed DSM Directive, which explicitly
called for the use of automated content recognition technologies designed to
83
monitor every upload to an ISP’s site to prevent copyright infringement.
As finalized, Article 17 has, at least on its face, acknowledged that general
monitoring of user uploads should not be required.
Article 17’s obligation for online content sharing sites to prevent infringing uploads and reuploads of infringing content applies only as to
works whose rights holders have provided the sites with “the relevant and
necessary information” to enable filtering technologies to detect that con84
tent. No similar limitation was contained in the precursor to Article 17.

autonomous (that is, uniform) meanings in all EU member states. See Case C-201/13,
Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132 (Sept. 3, 2014).
77.
Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 9, Explanatory Memorandum § 3.
78.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(9).
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 9, art. 13(2).
82.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(8). The European Copyright Society has
warned that to be consistent with the no-general-monitoring rule of the DSM’s Article 17, the
E-Commerce Directive’s Article 15, and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, ISP
hosting sites should not have to proactively monitor for infringements, and warned against the
“danger of overblocking” if national implementations adopt extreme views of the “best efforts” provisions of Article 17. Metzger & Senftleben, supra note 65, at 5.
83.
Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 9, art. 13(1).
84.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(4).
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Finally, there is a proportionality limit on the scope of Article 17. In determining whether an online content service is in compliance, legal decisionmakers are supposed to consider (1) the type, audience, and size of the
service, as well as the types of works uploaded by users to the sites; and (2)
the availability of “suitable and effective means” for compliance and their
85
cost for service providers. Unfortunately, neither the text nor the Recitals
of the DSM Directive provide guidance about how the proportionality principle should be interpreted in relation to service providers. As originally
86
proposed, the Directive vaguely mentioned proportionality, although it
provided even less guidance about the substance of this principle than Article 17 now does.
The European Commission hosted six stakeholder dialogues in late
2019 and early 2020 to get input for its development of best practices guidelines for fostering cooperation between online content sharing services and
87
rights holders. At the first meeting, one Commissioner expressed the hope
that now that the Directive was in place, stakeholders would put aside past
divisions on the issues and work together to make the new paradigm of Ar88
ticle 17 a success. However, no consensus emerged from these stakeholder
meetings about key issues, such as how to ensure that practicable measures
89
are put into place to safeguard user freedoms. After the Commission publishes its guidelines about Article 17 implementations, it may host additional stakeholder dialogue meetings. Yet, given how deeply divided stakeholders are about Article 17, it is unclear that the Commission will be able to
issue guidelines that will satisfy all stakeholders.
The Commission has left to EU member states the dilemma of trying to
transpose Article 17 into their national laws in a manner that meaningfully
accommodates the limitations on Article 17’s scope and is consistent with

85.
Id. art. 17(5).
86.
Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 9, art. 13(1), (3).
87.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(10). Commentary on the six stakeholder dialogues to date and links to materials are available on the Communia website,
https://www.communia-association.org/?s=stakeholder. Due to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, a seventh stakeholder dialogue, at which the European Commission was expected to issue some initial guidance about how to implement Article 17, did not occur. See
Paul Keller, Article 17 Stakeholder Dialogue: COMMUNIA Input Paper, COMMUNIA (Apr. 2,
2020),
https://www.communia-association.org/2020/04/02/article-17-stakeholder-dialoguecommunia-input-paper. On July 27, 2020, the EC issued a targeted consultation outlining initial views and requesting written comments from stakeholders by September 10 in order to
finalize its guidance to member states. See Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market: Commission Seeks the Views of Participants to the Stakeholder Dialogue on Article 17,
EUR. COMM’N (July 27, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/directivecopyright-digital-single-market-commission-seeks-views-participants-stakeholder.
88.
Paul Keller, Article 17 Stakeholder Dialogue (Day 1), COMMUNIA (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://www.communia-association.org/2019/10/23/article-17-stakeholder-dialogue-day-1old-old.
89.
Keller, supra note 65.
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the legislative compromises necessary to get sufficient political support for
the DSM Directive. Also left to member state legislators is the puzzle of
how to resolve the inherent contradictions embodied in Article 17, to which
we now turn.

B. Inherent Contradictions in Article 17
Article 17 contains inherently contradictory provisions on four types of
rules: those concerning user freedoms, general monitoring, licensing obligations, and personal data protection. It is difficult to imagine how these contradictions could be resolved through EU member state legislation. It will
not be surprising if some member states simply transpose the text of Article
17 into their laws, leaving many practical implementation issues to be negotiated between dominant players in the online services and copyright industries. Most of the tricky legal interpretation issues will be left to the courts.

1. Automated Content Recognition Technologies Are Inconsistent with
User Freedoms
The first serious internal contradiction in Article 17 is its implicit requirement that online content sharing sites must adopt automated content
recognition technologies to prevent infringing uploads and reuploads of infringing contents, while at the same time insisting that Article 17 should not
interfere with legitimate uses of copyrighted content, such as user creations
90
that are covered by copyright exceptions and limitations.
Automated content recognition technologies are much more sophisticated today than they were in 1998 or 2000 when the United States and EU
adopted their notice-and-takedown regimes. What these technologies do
well, however, is pattern-matching. They cannot take context into account.
Unfortunately, it is necessary to comprehend the context of a use to deter91
mine whether it is lawful under copyright exceptions. If content recognition technologies cannot assess context, they will make mistakes and block
uploads that should have been permitted. It is well-documented that several
types of common errors result from the use of automated content recogni92
tion technologies, including their inability to detect fair uses. EU policy90.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(4), (7).
91.
See, e.g., Paul Keller, Article 17 Stakeholder Dialogue (Day 4), COMMUNIA (Jan. 2,
2020),
https://www.communia-association.org/2020/01/02/article-17-stakeholder-dialogueday-4-transparency; see also DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 6–9
(statement of Meredith Rose, Policy Counsel, Public Knowledge) (discussing “bad” copyright
takedown notices due to algorithmic errors).
92.
See, e.g., Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright
Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 543–54 (2017) (giving numerous examples of automated
content recognition technology errors); see also Sharon Bar-Ziv & Niva Elkin-Koren, Behind
the Scenes of Online Copyright Enforcement: Empirical Evidence on Notice & Takedown, 50
CONN. L. REV. 339, 344, 376 (2018) (discussing examples of automated content recognition
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makers and legislators have not acknowledged this significant limitation of
automated content recognition technologies.
During some of the Commission’s stakeholder dialogue meetings, representatives of filtering technology firms admitted that their technologies
cannot understand context. As an Audible Magic representative stated,
“Copyright exceptions require a high degree of intellectual judgment and an
understanding and appreciation of context. We do not represent that any
technology can solve this problem in an automated fashion. Ultimately these
93
types of determinations must be handled by human judgment.” Others at
these dialogue sessions likewise attested that their technologies did not con94
sider context. But, as one participant observed in a blog about these dialogues, “as long as filtering technology cannot determine if a use is covered
by an exception or not then it does not meet the requirements established by
95
Article 17 of the Directive.” This contradiction is baked into Article 17. A
user upload of a parodic video that used a clip from a movie to make fun of
one of its characters, for instance, would be blocked by automated content
recognition technologies, even if the parody was lawful under EU law.
Sixty European intellectual property scholars have endorsed a statement, Safeguarding User Freedoms in Implementing Article 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: Recommendations from European Academics, which represents a valiant effort to offer at least a partial
96
resolution of this contradiction of Article 17. The statement discusses ways
to limit the use of preventive measures such as filtering technologies so that
these measures will not interfere with user rights. It recommends that only
exact or equivalent copies of the whole or substantial parts of protected
works should be subject to preventive measures. In addition, it suggests that
human review should be required to determine if user-generated content

technology errors); Bridy, supra note 10, at 345–47; Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86
U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 290 (2019) (noting inability of filtering algorithms to assess fair uses);
Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 36, at 478, 506; Michael Andor Brodeur, Copyright Bots and
Classical Musicians Are Fighting Online. The Bots Are Winning, WASH. POST (May 21,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/music/copyright-bots-and-classicalmusicians-are-fighting-online-the-bots-are-winning/2020/05/20/a11e349c-98ae-11ea-89fd28fb313d1886_story.html (describing filtering algorithms as incapable of distinguishing different performances of the same piece of classical music).
93.
Keller, supra note 91 (ellipsis omitted).
94.
Paul Keller, Article 17 Stakeholder Dialogue (Day 3), COMMUNIA (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://www.communia-association.org/2019/12/03/article-17-stakeholder-dialogue-day-3filters-not-meet-requirements-directive.
95.
Id.
96.
Quintais et al., supra note 76. Numerous other commentators have offered recommendations on how the EC can draft its implementing guidelines to mitigate the potential
harms of Article 17 for user freedoms. See, e.g., Krzysztof Garstka, Guiding the Blind Bloodhounds: How to Mitigate the Risks Article 17 of Directive 2019/790 Poses to the Freedom of
Expression, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Paul L.C. Torremans
ed., 4th ed. 2020); Keller, supra note 87; Metzger & Senftleben, supra note 65, at 9–14.
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such as remixes and mashups are covered by quotation or parody excep97
tions. It remains to be seen whether some of the EU member states will
follow such recommendations in their implementing legislation.

2. Automated Content Recognition Technologies Are Incompatible with
the No-General-Monitoring Mandate
A second contradiction built into Article 17 lies in its no-generalmonitoring rule, which is at odds with the requirement that online sharing
sites make “in accordance with high industry standards of professional diligence, best efforts to ensure the unavailability of specific works and other
subject matter for which the rightsholders have provided the service provid98
ers with the relevant and necessary information.” By “high industry standards of professional diligence,” the Commission seems to mean that these
services must make intensive use of automated content recognition technologies. These technologies cannot be effective without being general, because by design they scan every file uploaded onto the service’s site. Thus,
even though Article 17 no longer expressly requires use of “effective con99
tent recognition technologies,” as its precursor did, it is doubtful that
online sharing services could satisfy this “best efforts” requirement without
adopting such technologies. One European commentator has characterized
the no-general-monitoring provision of Article 17 as a “political state100
ment.” Yet, it makes Article 17 internally inconsistent.
The CJEU recognized the incompatibility of a general filtering technology mandate with the E-Commerce Directive’s no-general-monitoring rule
101
in its SABAM v. Netlog NV decision. SABAM, a Belgian music royalty
collecting society, sued Netlog, a social media network, for copyright infringement because some of its tens of millions of daily users had used the
site to exchange recorded music in which SABAM’s members held copyrights. As a remedy, SABAM asked for an injunction requiring Netlog to
install a filtering technology to detect copyright infringements. The CJEU

97.
See Quintais et al., supra note 76, ¶¶ 20, 27. Communia has created a flowchart
depicting how the Article 17 user rights safeguards could work. Keller, supra note 65.
98.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(4)(b); cf. id. art. 17(8) (no general monitoring obligation).
99.
Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 9, art. 13(1).
100.
Miquel Peguera, The New Copyright Directive: Online Content-Sharing Service
Providers Lose eCommerce Directive Immunity and Are Forced to Monitor Content Uploaded
by Users (Article 17), KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Sept. 26, 2019),
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2019/09/26/the-new-copyright-directive-onlinecontent-sharing-service-providers-lose-ecommerce-directive-immunity-and-are-forced-tomonitor-content-uploaded-by-users-article-17.
101.
Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85 ¶¶ 33–34 (Feb. 16,
2012).
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declared that such an obligation was inconsistent with the E-Commerce Di102
rective’s no-general-monitoring rule.
The CJEU has somewhat qualified this standard in the context of a def103
amation claim in Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland. The CJEU
decision approved an Austrian national court’s injunction requiring Facebook to remove defamatory comments about the plaintiff, an Austrian poli104
tician, and to prevent reuploads of the same or equivalent content. The
standard established in Glawischnig-Piesczek limits service provider monitoring to the specific content that a court has found to be unlawful. The
CJEU did not provide guidance about how this should be accomplished.
Although Article 17 of the DSM Directive explicitly overrides the safe
harbor set forth in Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive as applied to the
105
online content sharing sites it will regulate, it says nothing about overriding the Article 15 no-general-monitoring rule of the E-Commerce Directive.
Hence, that part of the E-Commerce Directive should still be in force, and
insofar as Article 17 requires the use of automated content recognition technologies to process all user uploads, Article 17 conflicts with Article 15 of
106
the E-Commerce Directive as well as Article 17(8).

102.
Id. ¶¶ 33, 52.
103.
Case
C-18/18,
Glawischnig-Piesczek
v.
Facebook
Ireland
Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶¶ 12, 46 (Oct. 3, 2019). For critical commentary on this decision, see,
e.g., Daphne Keller, Facebook Filters, Fundamental Rights, and the CJEU’s GlawischnigPiesczek Ruling, 69 GRUR INT’L 1 (2020).
104.
Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶¶ 37–41. Like Article 17(8) of the
DSM Directive and Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, § 512(m) of the DMCA provides that ISPs do not have a duty to monitor their sites for infringing materials. 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(m)(1). The Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study asserted that § 512(m) notwithstanding, ISPs should engage in more monitoring when they have reason to believe infringing materials exist on their sites. It urged Congress to revisit § 512(c) and (d) ISP-knowledge-ofinfringement requirements, as well as the willful blindness doctrine, to incentivize ISPs to do
more to thwart infringements on their sites. See SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 3–4,
123, 127.
105.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(3).
106.
The European Commission has, however, begun a consultation concerning the Digital Services Act, which contemplates a review and revision of the E-Commerce Directive,
including its intermediary liability rules. See, e.g., Natasha Lomas, Europe Asks for Views on
Platform Governance and Competition Tools, TECHCRUNCH (June 2, 2020),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/02/europe-asks-for-views-on-platform-governance-andcompetition-tools. On December 15, 2020, the EC issued first drafts of the Digital Services
Act along with the Digital Markets Act. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and
amending Directive 2000/31/EC, COM (2020) 825 final (Dec. 15, 2020); Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Contestable and Fair Markets in
the Digital Sector (Digital Markets Act), COM (2020) 842 final (Dec. 15, 2020).
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3. The Licensing Objectives of Article 17 Cannot Be Achieved
A third contradiction arises from Article 17’s unrealistic requirement
that online sharing sites make “best efforts” to get authorization for useruploaded content through licensing. As acknowledged in the Directive’s
preamble, the market for online content is complex and involves “a large
107
amount” of content. Indeed, there are literally billions of in-copyright
works of all kinds on the internet and billions of creators who own rights in
those works. It is simply impossible for online sharing sites to get authorization from all of the creators of these works. How could such services plausibly satisfy a “best efforts” requirement for these billions of works and their
108
creators?
Photographs are one type of copyrighted work that people share widely
through social media. It is not realistically possible for the operator of a social media site to identify and make sure to have a license for every photograph that its users share. Given how ubiquitous user-authored digital photographs are, which no established collecting societies could license, it is
virtually impossible for the service to identify each photograph’s copyright
owner and get a license for each one. For a service to take a license from a
collecting society that represents professional photographers when it hosts
user-authored photographs would mean paying them for works their members did not create. There is, moreover, no standard content recognition
identification system (such as fingerprinting) for photographs to enable a
service to detect infringing photographs.
The Commission has failed to recognize the impossibility of obtaining
licenses from all creators or to give guidance about what types of licenses a
site would have to try to secure. It also failed to consider the complexities of
the licensing market and the various business models and selective licensing
preferences of different copyright owners. Even though an important goal of
the DSM Directive is to support the existence of a “digital single market”
for EU content, there is, in fact, no one-stop-shop at which one can get EUwide licenses.

107.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, recital 62.
108.
See, e.g., Husovec, supra note 13, at 72 (“It is clear that obtaining such consent
[from all rights holders] is practically impossible, as transaction costs would be prohibitively
high.”); see also Metzger & Senftleben, supra note 65, at 5–6 (suggesting guidelines for implementing the licensing norm). Variations in translations of the DSM Directive will give rise
to disagreements about the “best efforts” requirement. See Eleonora Rosati, DSM Directive
Series #5: Does the DSM Directive Mean the Same Thing in All Language Versions?
The Case of “Best Efforts” in Article 17(4)(a), IPKAT (May 22, 2019),
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/05/dsm-directive-series-5-does-dsm.html (explaining that
some countries have translated “best” as “greater,” “greatest,” or “all” in their respective languages).
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4. Automated Content Recognition Technologies Require Processing of
Personal Data, Notwithstanding Article 17’s Assurance That User
Privacy Would Be Unaffected
A fourth contradiction embedded in Article 17 concerns personal data.
Article 17 states that it “shall not lead to any identification of individual users nor to the processing of personal data” except in accordance with EU
109
law. However, as the CJEU recognized in Netlog, automated content
recognition technologies are designed to monitor all user-uploaded content
on ISP hosting sites. This “involve[s] the identification, systematic analysis
and processing of information connected with [user] profiles . . . [which] is
protected personal data because, in principle, it allows those users to be
110
identified.” Interference with users’ personal data rights was one of the
bases on which the CJEU denied SABAM’s requested filtering injunction in
111
Netlog. The Commission has yet to explain its theory that Article 17 is
compatible with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the EU’s
112
framework for digital privacy laws.

C. Ambiguities in Article 17
The most significant and consequential ambiguity in Article 17 is its
vague definition of the online content sharing services that will be subject to
its strict rules. Recital 62 of the Directive says that the definition “should
target only online services that play an important role on the online content
market by competing with other online content services, such as online au113
dio and video streaming services for the same audiences.” However, Recitals do not have the force of law in the EU, and the Directive’s actual definition is much fuzzier:
“online content-sharing service provider” means a provider of an
information society service of which the main or one of the main
purposes is to store and give the public access to a large amount of
copyright-protected works or other protected subject matter up109.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(9).
110.
C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, ¶ 49 (Feb. 16, 2012).
111.
Id. ¶ 51; see also Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I11959, ¶ 53 (holding that an injunction to install filtering system would infringe users’ rights
to protection of personal data and freedom of expression under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights); Felipe Romero Moreno, ‘Upload Filters’ and Human Rights: Implementing Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, 34 INT’L REV. L. COMPUTS.
& TECH. 153, 162 (2020) (arguing that deep packet inspection of upload filters would invade
user privacy, personal data, and confidential communications).
112.
See, e.g., Moreno, supra note 111, at 164–65 (discussing how Article 17 might run
afoul of GDPR’s requirements). The Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study reports that copyright owners are frustrated by the GDPR, as it makes the task of identifying infringers more
difficult. See SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 34.
113.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, recital 62.
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loaded by its users, which it organises and promotes for profit114
making purposes.
This definition would seem to encompass ISPs that host UGC content
that is overwhelmingly created by the users who uploaded their works to the
ISP’s site (e.g., TikTok). The DSM Directive states that decisions about
whether an ISP falls within the online content sharing service definition
115
should be made on a case-by-case basis. ISPs that enable some contentsharing are at risk if they cannot reasonably predict whether they will be
subject to Article 17’s burdens. It is also unclear what “large” means in this
116
context.
With such vague terminology at the outset, it will be difficult for many
U.S. companies to know whether the Article 17 mandates apply to them.
Does the DSM Directive’s definition of an online content sharing service
include, for example, dating services such as Tinder, image-sharing services
such as Imgur, commentary sites such as Reddit, news sites that allow user
comments such as TechDirt, knitting share sites such as Ravelry, real estate
sites such as Zillow, website hosts such as WordPress, personal profile and
influencer blog sites such as Tumblr, or other new types of ISP yet to
emerge in the digital economy? A photography site, for example, might host
a large quantity of works whose copyrights are owned by the users who post
them, yet also host a small but non-trivial portion of works that are not.
Such legal uncertainty and attendant financial burdens are undesirable.
Also unclear is what actions online sharing sites must do to satisfy the
117
“best efforts” obligation to get licenses from rights holders. Collecting societies in the EU, as well as large EU-based rights holders, may be eager to
grant licenses to online content sharing services. Article 17 certainly provides them with leverage so that licenses are granted on their preferred
terms. However, during the stakeholder dialogue meetings, some rights
holders have made clear that they do not want to grant licenses. Movie studios, for example, are far more concerned with blocking any form of distri-

114.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 2(6) (emphasis added). National implementations of the DSM Directive could refine the definition of “online content-sharing service provider” to make that term less ambiguous. See Metzger & Senftleben, supra note 65, at 2–3.
115.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, recital 63.
116.
See, e.g., Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon et al., A Brief Exegesis of the Proposed Copyright Directive 4 (Nov. 24, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (https://ssrn.com
/abstract=2875296).
117.
See João Pedro Quintais & Martin Husovec, How to License Article 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive? Exploring the Implementation Options for the
New EU Rules on Content-Sharing Platforms, 70 GRUR INT’L (forthcoming 2021); see also
Matthias Leistner, European Copyright Licensing and Infringement Liability Under Art. 17
DSM-Directive, 2020 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GEISTIGES EIGENTUM/INTELL. PROP. J. 123 (discussing the need for collective blanket licenses for many categories of works and uses).
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bution or performance of their works, compared to their music industry
118
counterparts who enthusiastically seek licensing deals.
Moreover, it will be exceedingly expensive to negotiate licenses with
even the most obvious EU-based licensors because in virtually every member state of the EU there are specialized collecting societies that represent
different types of rights holders (e.g., composers, photographers, text authors). Each of these collecting societies (except in certain Nordic countries)
represents only those rights holders who are members, not other creators
who have chosen not to join the society. Furthermore, Article 17 applies to
all types of copyrighted works, some of which may not be represented by
collecting societies. Civil society groups have suggested the use of compulsory or statutory licenses to ease the burden on online sharing sites and benefit users, but major content industry groups have been unreceptive to these
119
suggestions.
The proportionality standard of Article 17(5) is similarly vague about
how it would affect an online content sharing service’s licensing and infringement prevention obligations under Article 17(4). Article 17(5) directs
consideration of the size and type of the service, the type of content it
serves, and its audience, as well as the availability of relevant means and
costs to the service provider. Yet there is no guidance about how these factors are to be weighed and how this would affect obligations. An ISP that
arguably falls within the DSM definition of online content sharing sites
cannot reasonably determine its compliance obligations given the vagueness
of this standard. Obviously, YouTube would be held to a high standard, but
it has already deployed Content ID, which some copyright owners neverthe120
less complain does not block enough content. Neither the text of Article
17 nor the DSM preamble provides meaningful guidance about how this
standard would be assessed.
The so-called startup exception set forth in Article 17(6), moreover, is
woefully narrow. It offers very little protection to these nascent businesses.
If in the second year of a startup’s operation, for example, some user uploads go viral, causing monthly visitors to exceed five million, then this lim121
itation on the service provider’s liability would no longer apply, even if
the viral content was perfectly legal. An eligible service would, moreover,
lose this limitation on liability at the start of its third year, even though it
might remain as small in that third year as in the first two years of its operations. Investors will be reluctant to provide seed funding if the very high ex-

118.
Paul Keller, Article 17 Stakeholder Dialogue: What Have We Learned So Far,
COMMUNIA (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.communia-association.org/2020/01/16/article-17stakeholder-dialogue-learned-far.
119.
See, e.g., Keller, supra note 88.
120.
See, e.g., SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 44.
121.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(6).
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penses of filtering and licensing will automatically kick in before the startup
has a chance to prove its worth in the marketplace.

D. Article 17 Will Harm Small and Medium-Sized ISPs
Recall that prior to the final vote on the Directive, 240 EU-based online
service providers explained in a letter to the European Parliament that small
and medium-sized enterprises cannot afford to develop or deploy automated
122
content recognition technologies and take on other related expenses.
These technologies are expensive to develop and operate, as new reference
files about digital content must be constantly added and system upgrades
will be an ongoing necessity. Service providers may end up locked-in to a
particular technology provider, even if the technology turns out to be
flawed.
The “best efforts” licensing burden of Article 17 will also put small and
medium-sized firms at a significant disadvantage, especially if they have to
negotiate with numerous collecting societies on a member-state-bymember-state basis. Moreover, the startup limitation on Article 17 is so narrow, it cannot overcome the obstacles that Article 17 poses for these firms.
One would hope that EU competition authorities might be able to help to
mitigate these problems, but those authorities did not weigh in on the competitive impacts of the DSM Directive as the Directive was being finalized.
Google has reportedly spent about $100 million to develop Content
123
ID, but it does not license that technology to other ISPs. Because its development of this technology gives Google a competitive edge, it is unlikely
that this policy will change. Other firms, including Audible Magic, do li124
cense their automated content recognition technologies, but Article 17like mandates may cause prices for these licenses to skyrocket beyond what
would prevail if firms were free to choose whether to take such licenses. Article 17 may have created incentives for developing new automated content
125
recognition technologies, but it remains to be seen whether existing or future technologies will satisfy the vague “best efforts” requirement or whether the emergence of competitive filtering systems will be impeded by pa-

122.
See Bridy, supra note 10, at 349–50; Poortvliet, supra note 61. But see Metzger &
Senftleben, supra note 65, at 6–8 (suggesting some accommodations for small and mediumsized online content sharing services).
123.
See Bridy, supra note 10, at 350.
124.
See id. at 341.
125.
Martin Husovec has questioned this incentives story and persuasively argued that
“demand for [filtering] technologies is actually likely to shrink under [notice-and-staydown]
compared to [notice-and-takedown], where both intermediaries and right holders are interested in the services.” Husovec, supra note 13, at 76. Mandating use of filtering technologies
would likely, he argues, cause fewer ISPs to enter or remain in the market. Larger ISPs are
more likely to build their own technologies to gain a competitive advantage over other ISPs,
so they too may be less likely to license independent filtering systems. Id. at 75–76.
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tents. Competition authorities should monitor the impact of Article 17 on
entry into online services markets.
EU policymakers also appear to have misapprehended the formidable
technical challenges of developing a massive filtering system, such as difficulties in acquiring the necessary reference files of digital content necessary
126
for an automated content recognition engine to do pattern-matching.
While Content ID and Audible Magic have large databases of reference
files, these files overwhelmingly identify sound recordings and motion pictures. However, Article 17 does not restrict its implicit filtering mandate to
only these types of copyrighted content. Many online content sharing services that would arguably be subject to Article 17 host other types of contents, such as fan fiction stories, photographs, and mixed media works, for
which automated content recognition technologies, as well as entities capable of licensing rights in these types of content, are unavailable.

E. Article 17 May Violate the European Charter of Fundamental Rights
In December 2020, Netherlands became the first member state to transpose Article 17 into its national copyright law, while France adopted a law
127
authorizing implementation by decree. In addition, as this Article is going
to press, Germany, Austria, and Finland are considering proposals for im128
plementing this complex regulation. France and the Netherlands appear to
have taken different approaches in their respective transpositions, but neither meaningfully addresses the preservation of user rights, the no-general-

126.
See Bridy, supra note 10, at 351; see also Husovec, supra note 13, at 74 (“Collecting and verifying meta-data constitutes large transaction costs, so their lack could easily impede use of [filtering] tools.”).
127.
Paul Keller, Divergence Instead of Guidance: The Article 17 Implementation Discussion in 2020—Part 2, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Jan. 22, 2021),
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/01/22/divergence-instead-of-guidance-the-article17-implementation-discussion-in-2020-part-2.
128.
See id.; Paul Keller, DSM Directive Implementation Update: More Proposals to
Protect Users’ Rights, COMMUNIA (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.communia-association.org
/2021/01/07/dsm-directive-implementation-update-more-proposals-to-protect-users-rights.
Denmark has announced that it will not conclude its implementation process until after the
June deadline. Id. CREATe is maintaining a webpage tracking each member state’s implementation process. See Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive – Implementation,
CREATE,
https://www.create.ac.uk/cdsm-implementation-resource-page/#consultationstranspositions. According to the CREATe site, Croatia and Hungary appear to have published
draft legislation, but with little or no English-language commentary. Id. The European Copyright Society has asserted that most terms of Article 17 are subject to the CJEU’s review as
autonomous interpretations of the Directive. Metzger & Senftleben, supra note 65, at 9. This
may mean that national deviations from key terms may be struck down by the CJEU. The
United Kingdom, which is no longer a member of the EU, announced that it would not implement the DSM Directive. See Copyright: EU Action, Written Question 4371, UK
PARLIAMENT,
https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answersstatements/written-question/Commons/2020-01-16/4371.
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129

monitoring, or personal data rights issues raised above. The draft implementation proposals of Germany, Austria, and Finland, on the other hand,
attempt to balance the interests of rights holders and users along with
providing some clarity to content sharing services, though they are not en130
tirely free of blemishes. Because there has been little actual implementation of Article 17, it is premature to assess whether member states will be
able to resolve its internal contradictions. Additionally, we cannot know
whether Article 17 implementations will achieve the Directive’s objectives
of getting substantial revenues to EU rights holders, lessening the amount of
online infringement on content sharing sites, and harmonizing the laws of
131
EU member states to create a digital single market.
The government of Poland has mounted a challenge to the legality of
Article 17 before the CJEU. It has asked that court to annul Article 17(4)(b)
132
and 17(4)(c) or, in the alternative, to annul Article 17 entirely. Poland
contends that Article 17 makes it necessary for content sharing services to
employ upload filters as “preventive control mechanisms,” which is incompatible with the right to freedom of expression and information guaranteed
133
by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Whether the CJEU will
129.
Paul Keller, Article 17: Both French and Dutch Implementation Proposals Lack
Key User Rights Safeguards, COMMUNIA (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.communiaassociation.org/2020/01/10/article-17-implementation-french-dutch-implementationproposals-lack-key-user-rights-safeguards.
130.
See, e.g., Paul Keller, Austrian Article 17 Proposal: The High Road Towards Implementation?, COMMUNIA (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.communia-association.org/2020/12
/14/austrian-article-17-proposal-high-road-towards-implementation; Paul Keller, Finnish Article 17 Implementation Proposal Prohibits the Use of Automated Upload Filters, COMMUNIA
(Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.communia-association.org/2020/12/23/finnish-article-17implementation-proposal-prohibits-the-use-of-automated-upload-filters; Julia Reda, In Copyright Reform, Germany Wants to Avoid Over-Blocking, Not Rule Out Upload Filters—Part 1,
KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (July 9, 2020), http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2020/07/09
/in-copyright-reform-germany-wants-to-avoid-over-blocking-not-rule-out-upload-filters-part1/?doing_wp_cron=1594746228.0162110328674316406250.
131.
See also Copyright in Foreign Jurisdictions Hearing, supra note 3, at 8 (statement
of Julia Reda, Former Member of the European Parliament & Fellow, Berkman Klein Center
for Internet & Society, Harvard University) (“The adoption of the DSM Directive has plunged
online businesses into legal uncertainty that is likely to stretch for years, if not decades.”).
132.
Case C-401/19, Republic of Poland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union (May 29, 2019). On November 10, 2020, the CJEU heard arguments in this
case, which reportedly revealed inherent conflicts within Article 17. A ruling is expected in
summer of 2021. See, e.g., Paul Keller, CJEU Hearing in the Polish Challenge to Article 17:
Not Even the Supporters of the Provision Agree on How It Should Work, KLUWER
COPYRIGHT BLOG (Nov. 11, 2020), http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2020/11/11/cjeuhearing-in-the-polish-challenge-to-article-17-not-even-the-supporters-of-the-provision-agreeon-how-it-should-work.
133.
Case C-401/19, Republic of Poland; see, e.g., Christophe Geiger et al., Intermediary Liability and Fundamental Rights, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERMEDIARY
LIABILITY ONLINE 139, 140–46 (Giancarlo Frosio ed., 2020), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3411633 (discussing fundamental freedoms and concerns about Article 17 undermining them); JULIA REDA ET AL., GESELLSCHAFT FÜR FREIHEITSRECHTE E.V., ARTICLE 17
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rule Article 17 unconstitutional on its face remains to be seen. This is, how134
ever, far from a frivolous complaint given the CJEU’s Netlog decision,
135
among others. Recall that SABAM was denied, on fundamental rights
grounds, to get an injunction that would require Netlog to install filters to
136
prevent the availability of infringing music on its network.
The recent Glawischnig-Piesczek decision might suggest that the CJEU
has become more tolerant of injunctions that impose monitoring obligations,
although the injunction in that case focused on blocking access to a specific
137
instance of online content that had been adjudicated to be unlawful. It is
important to note that this CJEU opinion did not analyze the impact of such
a monitoring injunction on fundamental rights, as the CJEU’s Netlog deci138
sion did.
The CJEU in Netlog ruled that the injunction SABAM sought that
would impose a general monitoring obligation on that ISP would violate Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive and fundamental freedoms under the
139
European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Such an injunction would not
respect a fair balance between the interests of copyright owners, on the one
hand, and the freedom to conduct one’s business on the other. In addition,
the “contested filtering system may also infringe the fundamental rights of
that hosting service provider’s service users, namely, their right to protection of their personal data and their freedom to receive or impart infor140
mation.” The CJEU also observed that filtering technologies cannot distinguish between lawful and unlawful uses of contents and so could block
141
lawful communications under copyright exceptions. Leading scholars in

DIRECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET: A FUNDAMENTAL
ASSESSMENT (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3732223 (assessing Article 17 and
concluding that it fails to balance the fundamental rights affected).
134.
Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, ¶¶ 33–34 (Feb. 16,
2012); see supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text (discussing Netlog); see also Bridy,
supra note 10, at 344–46 (discussing the CJEU’s Netlog decision).
135.
See, e.g., Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, ¶
53 (holding that an injunction to require peer-to-peer filesharing service to install filtering system would violate EU Directives and fundamental rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights); see also Bridy, supra note 10, at 343–44, 346 (discussing Scarlet Extended).
136.
Netlog, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, ¶¶ 39–52.
137.
Case
C-18/18,
Glawischnig-Piesczek
v.
Facebook
Ireland
Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:458458, ¶ 53 (Oct. 3, 2019).
138.
Id.; see also Copyright in Foreign Jurisdictions Hearing, supra note 3, at 7–9
(statement of Daphne Keller, Professor of Law, Stanford University) (noting that the “filtering
requirement like the one imposed in Facebook’s Austrian case would be unconstitutional in
the U.S.”).
139.
Netlog, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, ¶¶ 38, 46–50.
140.
Id. ¶ 48.
141.
Id. ¶ 50.
OF THE
RIGHTS
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the EU have criticized the DSM’s upload filter requirement for ISPs on sim142
ilar fundamental freedom grounds.
Yet, even if Article 17 survives Poland’s challenge, national implementations and judicial interpretations of its provisions in particular cases will
still be subject to judicial review. Several commentators have, therefore, focused on recommendations to ensure maximal compliance with user rights
143
and freedoms.
Fundamental freedoms could be preserved insofar as Article 17 would
allow online content services to avoid having to adopt automated content
recognition technologies if they obtain licenses to cover user uploads of
copyrighted content. This may be somewhat feasible in the EU because
many collecting societies have the capacity to grant licenses to a wide varie144
ty of works on behalf of large numbers of specific categories of creators.
The United States, by contrast, has almost no well-established and wellfunctioning collecting societies—except as to music—akin to those prevalent in the EU that could enable licensing of millions of copyrighted
145
works. Because of this, licensing is not a viable alternative for U.S.-based
content sharing platforms to avoid having to adopt automated content
recognition technologies under the EU Directive or under any U.S. adoption
of an Article 17-like regime. This is yet another reason why Congress
should not look to Article 17 as a model in any reconsideration of the
§ 512(c) DMCA safe harbor.
The EU has a very different and much more paternalistic regulatory le146
gal culture than the United States. With the adoption of Article 17, the EU
has created a complex new regulatory framework that will make it very difficult, and perhaps impossible, for most UGC platforms to continue to operate and offer culturally diverse contents to EU residents. There is a reason
why U.S.-based internet platforms have been so much more successful than
EU-based firms: the U.S. legal culture is less paternalistic and more hospi142.
See, e.g., Angelopoulos, supra note 60; Garstka, supra note 96; Geiger et al., supra
note 133; Moreno, supra note 111. A very recent assessment concludes that Article 17 is incompatible with fundamental rights. Christophe Geiger & Bernd Justin Jütte, Platform Liability Under Article 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive, Automated Filtering and Fundamental Rights: An Impossible Match, 70 GRUR INT’L (forthcoming 2021).
143.
See DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(10) (directing the EC to hold stakeholder
dialogues to discuss best practices and that special account be taken “of the need to balance
fundamental rights and of the use of exceptions and limitations.”); see, e.g., Quintais et al.,
supra note 76; Metzger & Senftleben, supra note 65; Moreno, supra note 111.
144.
See, e.g., COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS ch.
4–8 (Daniel Gervais ed., 3d ed. 2015) (discussing collective management in the EU and specific countries and sectors of Europe); Quintais & Husovec, supra note 117 (discussing licensing options).
145.
See COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT, supra note 144, ch. 11.
146.
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Regulating Technology Through Copyright Law: A
Comparative Perspective, 42 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 214 (2020) (discussing differences in
the copyright and legal cultures of the United States and the EU).
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table to entrepreneurship and innovation. For the many reasons set forth in
this Part, Article 17 should not serve as a model for any reconsideration of
ISP safe harbors by the U.S. Congress.

III. Congress Should Take a Balanced Approach in Regulating
ISPs That Host User-Uploaded Content
Insofar as the U.S. Congress reconsiders the DMCA safe harbors, it
should strive for a balanced approach. As important as are the interests of
the copyright industries and professional authors and artists who support
stronger copyright rules, there are other important industry, individual creator, and public interests at stake in the regulations that affect online content
hosting services. Many of these stakeholders would be adversely affected by
U.S. adoption of Article 17-like rules or by changes to the DMCA safe harbors recommended in the Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study.

A. The U.S. Copyright Office Section 512 Study Does Not Fairly
Balance Stakeholder Interests
To prepare for its Section 512 Study, the Copyright Office solicited
comments from stakeholders and hosted a series of roundtables about how
147
the DMCA safe harbors have been working over the past two decades.
After nearly five years of work, the Office concluded that the DMCA notice-and-takedown regime is “unbalanced” and needs some “fine148
tun[ing].” Unfortunately, the Study itself is imbalanced, premised, as it is,
on an oversimplistic duality: even if ISPs think § 512 is working reasonably
well, copyright industries do not, and “the fact that one of the two principal
groups whose interests Congress sought to balance is virtually uniform in its
dissatisfaction with the current system suggests that at least some of the
149
statute’s objectives are not being met.” The Study gave essentially no attention to the interests of the hundreds of millions of internet users and the
many millions of user-creators who rely on content-sharing platforms to
150
reach audiences, even though copyright law is supposed to promote the
public interest, not just the interests of major copyright industry groups.

147.
SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 1. The Office received more than 92,000
written comments in response to its call for comments. Id. at 12–13.
148.
SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 72, 198.
149.
Id. at 83. Perusing the public comments submitted to the Copyright Office for its
512 Study, https://copyright.gov/policy/section512/, it is worth noting that none of the major
software or videogame companies, which are significant players in the copyright industries,
took positions against the DMCA safe harbors. Nor were broadcast and cable companies on
record as opposed to these rules.
150.
See DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 3–5 (statement of
Abigail Rives, IP Counsel, Engine); DMCA’s Notice-and Takedown Hearing, supra, 4–5
(statement of Jonathan Berroya, then-Interim President and CEO, Internet Association).
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The Study criticized the courts for construing too broadly the types of
services that Congress intended to qualify for the § 512 safe harbors, particularly § 512(c) for hosting user contents, on the theory that certain unfore151
seen activities were “related” to storage on behalf of users. The Study
suggested that Congress intended for the § 512(c) safe harbor to apply only
to services that passively store information on behalf of users. Under this
interpretation, Wikipedia would probably qualify for this safe harbor, but
virtually every other ISP that hosts user-uploaded contents would not. As
one witness at a Senate IP Subcommittee hearing observed in written testimony, to restrict the safe harbors to the types of hosting services common in
1998 “would all but exclude every modern OSP from the scope of section
512(c), giving liability protections only to the bulletin board services from
152
the 1990s.” This witness pointed out that the Study ignored that “the
DMCA was intended to incentivize innovation and the growth of the internet” and that “algorithmic recommendations—which benefit users by connecting them to their communities and information they are likely to be interested in—do not negate the principle that the underlying content is stored
153
at the direction of the user.”
The Study was also highly critical of judicial decisions concerning what
constitutes actual knowledge of infringement on an ISP’s site, “red flag”
knowledge, willful blindness to infringement, and, by extension, judicial interpretations of § 512(m), which provides that ISPs have no duty to monitor
154
for infringement. The Study faulted decisions that it thought had conflated
the actual and “red flag” (that is, where facts and circumstances make infringing activity on the site apparent) knowledge standards, which in its estimation created an excessively narrow space in which to define an ISP’s
155
obligation. The Study asserted that an ISP has “red flag” knowledge if it
156
has a more general knowledge of infringing materials on its site. Moreover, if an ISP received repeat takedown notices about one of its users, the
157
Study would treat this as “red flag” knowledge.

151.
SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 84–95. For instance, it criticized the Second
Circuit’s ruling in Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2012), that
YouTube was eligible for the § 512(c) safe harbor insofar as it transcoded uploaded videos,
enabled other users to view them, and provided automated recommendations because these
activities were sufficiently related to hosting user contents.
152.
Id.; see DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 7 (statement of
Jonathan Berroya, then-Interim President and CEO, Internet Association) (adding “[s]imply
because the internet experience in 1998 was not as rich as it is now does not mean that today’s
OSPs should be excluded from the safe harbor.”)
153.
DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 16 (statement of Jonathan
Berroya, then-Interim President and CEO, Internet Association).
154.
SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 111–28.
155.
Id. at 113–24.
156.
Id. at 111–12 n.591.
157.
Id. at 114.
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Although § 512(m) provides that ISPs do not have a duty to monitor
their sites for infringing materials, the Study concluded that ISPs should
monitor their sites and have a duty to investigate further if its staff comes
158
across material that may be infringing. Failure to do so, it suggests, may
159
justify a finding of willful blindness to infringement. The Study suggested
that larger ISPs that host user-uploaded audiovisual works “with a history of
hosting infringing content may need to implement costly filtering technologies,” even if smaller sites “might just need to assign content review to an
160
existing employee.”
The Study concluded that courts have also given ISPs too much leeway
161
in formulating and carrying out repeat infringer policies. ISPs should, it
suggests, be required to publicly disclose the terms on which they will ter162
minate users charged with infringement. Many ISPs do not inform their
users about the circumstances under which their accounts will be terminated. The Study asserted that users need to know what the ISP’s policy is and
163
what will happen if they violate it. Moreover, it equates an ISP’s receipt
of facially compliant takedown notices for particular users as evidence that
the users actually are infringers, evidence that should count toward termina164
tion of the users’ accounts. This is analogous to thinking that filing a
complaint in federal court is the same thing as getting a judgment on the
merits.
The Study faulted ISPs for choosing not to remove or disable content
after receiving a takedown notice in circumstances where the ISPs believe

158.
Id. at 122–124.
159.
Id. at 126–27.
160.
Id. at 123–24.
161.
Id. at 95–110.
162.
Id. at 106. Meredith Rose, Policy Counsel of Public Knowledge, raised concerns in
her Senate testimony about termination of Internet access as a penalty for repeat infringement
as applied to customers of broadband services because the Internet has become an essential
communications service in the modern era. (This has been abundantly clear during the coronavirus pandemic.) Many households depend on Internet access for its members to be able to
work remotely, attend classes, access medical care, get news, and communicate with others.
Misdeeds by one member of a household should not result in everyone in that household being completely cut off from the world. DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note
16, at 15–18 (statement of Meredith Rose, Policy Counsel, Public Knowledge). This is particularly true for the more than 100 million households that have access to only one broadband
provider. Id.; see also Geiger et al., supra note 133, at 4–8 (arguing that Internet access has
been evolving as a fundamental human right). The Study did at least recognize that a “different approach” should be taken toward university students because cutting off their Internet
access would be “tantamount to expelling them from the university.” SECTION 512 STUDY,
supra note 14, at 109–10 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also DMCA’s Notice-andTakedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 6 (statement of David Hansen, Lead Copyright & Information Policy Officer, Duke University) (“I cannot overstate how critical network access
has become for modern teaching and learning . . . .”).
163.
SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 106.
164.
Id. at 98–103.
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that the challenged use is fair or otherwise non-infringing. In the Office’s
view, this fails to honor the statutory requirement that ISPs act expeditiously
to remove or disable access after getting facially compliant takedown notic165
es. The Study failed to acknowledge that it is risky for an ISP to decide
not to remove challenged content, as the safe harbor would no longer apply
if its judgment about fair use was wrong. The Study also asserted that copyright owners should not have to consider whether someone’s use of their
content was fair use before sending takedown notices to ISPs, a conclusion
166
that directly contradicts a well-known Ninth Circuit decision. Without this
check on copyright owner discretion, takedown notice abuse will become
even more of a problem than it already is.
Although the Study claimed that it was not recommending “wholesale
changes” to § 512, it invited Congress to “fine-tune” many aspects of the
safe harbor provisions to tilt the balance in the direction that copyright in167
dustries have requested. In most respects, the proposed changes would, in
168
fact, radically alter the DMCA safe harbors. Although the Study declined
to recommend enactment of an Article 17-like notice-and-staydown rule, as
some copyright industry players had urged, it recommended further study of
169
notice-and-staydown rules as well as no-fault site-blocking injunctions.
In some respects, the Copyright Office Section 512 Study is actually
worse for most ISPs than Article 17. After all, Article 17 only applies to forprofit online content sharing services that make available, organize, and
promote “large” amounts of user-uploaded content. At least some smaller
entities are exempt from Article 17, as are nonprofit online encyclopedias,
educational and scientific repositories, and open source software developing
and sharing sites, as well as providers of electronic communication services,
online marketplaces, business-to-business cloud services, and cloud services
170
that allow users to upload content for their own use. The Section 512
Study, by contrast, recommended imposing greater obligations on all ISPs,

165.
Id. at 152–55.
166.
Id. at 148–52. The Study faults the Ninth Circuit for concluding otherwise in Lenz
v. Universal Music Group, Inc., 815 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016). See SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 148–49.
167.
Id. at 7, 198.
168.
The Study’s recommended changes to the standards of ISP knowledge about users’
infringements would profoundly change the safe harbors, as would its recommendations to
contract the categories of ISPs eligible for safe harbors. Id. at 84–95, 111–26. As Jonathan
Berroya of the Internet Association put the point, “the cumulative effect of the changes recommended by the [Study] would be to disrupt the balance established by Congress in Section
512 to the detriment of Internet users, including businesses and individual creators.” DMCA’s
Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 7 (statement of Jonathan Berroya, thenInterim President and CEO, Internet Association).
169.
SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 186–96.
170.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 2(6).
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although occasionally suggesting that smaller entities may have lesser bur171
dens when it comes to monitoring user-uploaded content.
In contrast to the Section 512 Study’s quite dismissive treatment of fair
172
uses, Article 17 requires member states to ensure that fundamental user
freedoms will be respected even when a hosting service uses automated
content recognition technologies. It directed members states to ensure the
preservation of user-generated content that quotes from or parodies other
173
works under copyright exceptions.

B. The DMCA Safe Harbors Have Enabled U.S.-Based ISPs to Thrive
The Section 512 Study understated the importance of the DMCA safe
harbors for small and medium-sized U.S.-based ISPs, as documented in the
seminal empirical study authored by Professor Jennifer Urban, et al., Notice
174
and Takedown in Everyday Practice. That report concluded that the majority of ISPs that host user contents are “DMCA Classic” platforms. These
ISPs follow the protocol that § 512(c) establishes: after receiving notices
from copyright owners about specific claimed infringements on the ISP’s
site, the ISPs investigate and take down or disable access to infringing mate175
rials on their sites. For small and medium-sized companies, this noticeand-takedown process is a burden, but their staff members dutifully review
the notices individually and comply with valid takedowns, as the law re176
quires. The DMCA Classic ISPs depend heavily on the § 512(c) safe harbor for their very existence. These ISPs are, moreover, not the sources of
significant infringements; they take very seriously their responsibilities to
process takedown notices in the manner that Congress expected with adopt177
ing the DMCA. They do not automatically take down user-uploaded content if the takedown notice they receive from a rights holder or its agent is
flawed, as often happens.
171.
SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 123–24.
172.
The Study would relieve copyright owners of the responsibility to consider fair use
before sending takedown notices and criticized ISPs that decide to allow a challenged use to
remain on their sites because the use was fair and non-infringing. Id. at 150–55.
173.
DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(7). In its discussion of the DSM Directive,
the Section 512 Study does not mention Article 17’s commitment to allowing users to exercise fundamental freedoms in creating works they upload to sharing service sites. SECTION
512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 61–63.
174.
JENNIFER URBAN ET AL., NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN IN EVERYDAY PRACTICE 73
(2016). The report’s findings were also published in digested, updated versions. See Jennifer
M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown: Online Service Provider and Rightsholder Accounts of
Everyday Practice, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 371 (2017) [hereinafter Urban et al., Notice
and Takedown]; Jennifer M. Urban et al., Takedown in Two Worlds: An Empirical Analysis,
64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 483 (2017).
175.
Urban et al., Notice and Takedown, supra note 174, at 381. ISPs report that many
of the takedown notices they get are unsound. Id. at 381, 385–88.
176.
Id. at 398.
177.
Id.; see also Hinze, supra note 38, ch. 8.
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The Urban Study analyzed a six-month sample of takedown notices and
reported that a high proportion—nearly one-third—were flawed, either because the takedown notice was incomplete or fraudulent, the uploaded material was fair use, or the notice provider was not the owner of a copyright al178
leged to be infringed. Numerous other submissions to the Copyright
Office during the Section 512 Study process also documented these abus179
es. The Study cited “a series of extensively researched articles” in the
Wall Street Journal reporting on takedown abuses, one of which pointed out
180
that Google had reinstated more than 50,000 wrongfully removed links.
Nevertheless, the Study concluded that “[b]ecause much of the data relating
to notice-and-takedown requests is not public, it is difficult to ascertain the
extent to which some of these examples are representative of what’s hap181
pening in the section 512 ecosystem.” It seemed to accept uncritically assertions of copyright industry representatives that abusive notices are “in182
credibly rare.”
Unlike their smaller counterparts, dominant platforms such as YouTube
and Facebook will be able to adapt to whatever ISP liability rules Congress
might choose to adopt. These platforms and other large ISPs have sought to
be more than DMCA-compliant by automating their handling of thousands
or even millions of notices sent to the platforms by bots and takedowns for
183
unlawful uploads. Some large platforms (notably YouTube) go well beyond what the DMCA requires by developing or licensing filtering technologies, offering special takedown procedures for trusted rights holders, hashmatching based “stay down” systems, as well as agreeing to contractual
184
terms that place additional obligations on these ISPs.
YouTube and Facebook greatly benefited in their early years from the
existence of the DMCA and the EU’s E-Commerce safe harbors which enabled them to become dominant platforms. Now that they have achieved

178.
Urban et al., supra note 174, at 88; see also DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 3–9 (statement of Meredith Rose, Policy Counsel, Public Knowledge).
179.
SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 146–47 nn.784–87.
180.
Andrea Fuller et al., Google Hides News, Tricked by Fake Claims, WALL ST. J.
(May 15, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/googledmca-copyright-claims-takedownonline-reputation-11589557001, cited in SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 148 n.790.
The Office noted that “[s]uch abuses of the DMCA system do call for some enforcement
mechanism,” but it offered no recommendations about this. See also DMCA’s Notice-andTakedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 3–9 (statement of Meredith Rose, Policy Counsel, Public Knowledge) (criticizing the Study for its failure to give credence to ISP complaints about
“bad” notices).
181.
SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 147.
182.
Id. at 148.
183.
Urban et al., Notice and Takedown, supra note 174, at 382.
184.
Id. at 382–83 (describing “DMCA Plus” OSPs); see, e.g., Videos Removed
or Blocked Due to YouTube’s Contractual Obligations, YOUTUBE HELP,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/3045545 (describing YouTube agreements with
certain music rights holders requiring specific takedown obligations).
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dominance, they may benefit further if legislatures change the DMCA rules
in a way that would, in effect, pull the ladder up behind them. Indeed, the
dominance of these mega-platforms would be further entrenched if new
regulations put small and medium-sized platforms at a disadvantage or even
185
cause them to fold.
The Section 512 Study failed to acknowledge how important U.S.based internet companies, including online platforms, have become to the
U.S. economy. A study conducted for the Internet Association reported that
this sector contributed more than $2 trillion to the U.S. gross domestic
186
product (GDP) in 2018, said to represent about 10% of GDP. That study
also reported that this sector directly created six million jobs and indirectly
187
supported an additional 13 million jobs in the United States. A Bureau of
Economic Analysis study of the U.S. digital economy for the U.S. Department of Commerce estimated that this sector contributed $1.35 trillion to the
188
economy in 2017, or 6.9% of GDP. In the Forbes 2019 ranking of the
world’s top 100 digital companies, U.S.-based firms dominated the top ten
189
and comprised nearly half of the top 25. ISPs, including platforms that enable user uploads, are among the many types of information technology
firms that make up this sector. All but five of the top 20 internet companies
190
measured by market value are U.S.-based firms. The success of the U.S.
internet economy is due in no small measure to the DMCA safe harbor
191
regulations.
185.
See, e.g., Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Automation in Moderation, 53 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 41, 67, 71 (2020); see also DMCA at 22 Hearing, supra note 16, at 1–2 (statement of Rebecca Tushnet, Professor of Law, Harvard University).
186.
Christopher Hooton, Measuring the US Internet Sector: 2019, INTERNET ASS’N
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://internetassociation.org/publications/measuring-us-internet-sector2019. The Internet Association is a trade association representing leading global internet companies. Id. at 20 (listing member companies including major U.S.-based companies).
187.
Id.
188.
Digital Economy Accounted for 6.9 Percent of GDP in 2017, BUREAU OF ECON.
ANALYSIS (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.bea.gov/news/blog/2019-04-04/digital-economyaccounted-69-percent-gdp-2017.
189.
See Top 100 Digital Companies: 2019 Ranking, FORBES (Oct. 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/top-digital-companies/list/#tab:rank. Only three of the top 25 were
EU-based, the highest ranked at #19. See also TOP 100 GLOBAL TECH LEADERS REPORT,
THOMSON REUTERS (Jan. 2018), https://www.thomsonreuters.com/content/dam/ewp-m
/documents/thomsonreuters/en/pdf/reports/thomson-reuters-top-100-global-tech-leadersreport.pdf (showing 45 of the top technology companies worldwide are U.S.-based, while only
8 are EU-based).
190.
J. Clement, Market Capitalization of the Biggest Internet Companies Worldwide as
of June 2019, STATISTA (June 23, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/277483
/market-value-of-the-largest-internet-companies-worldwide/
[https://web.archive.org/web
/20210129222447/https://www.statista.com/statistics/277483/market-value-of-the-largestinternet-companies-worldwide/]. Along with the U.S.-based companies listed are several
companies based in China; none are EU-based. Id.
191.
See, e.g., David Kravets, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA Is the Law That
Saved the Web, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2000), https://www.wired.com/2008/10/ten-years-later (“To-

Spring 2021]

Pushing Back on Copyright ISP Copyright Rules

337

Few of the top internet companies are EU-based. When adopting Article 17, EU policymakers did not consider the likely competition and innovation consequences of the DSM Directive, especially the significant market
entry barriers for EU-based ISPs it would erect. Perhaps EU policymakers
have given up on being able to nurture European platforms to compete with
successful U.S.-based firms. Either that or these policymakers were oblivious to the impacts that Article 17 and similar rules would have on competition and innovation in online content hosting markets. The Commission’s
main goal with Article 17 seems to have been to enable EU rights holders to
extract rents from existing U.S.-based mega-platforms, not to provide incentives for new EU-based platforms to compete with the mega-platforms or
192
innovate around them.

C. The U.S. Safe Harbor Regime Has Fostered an Unprecedented
Outpouring of Creative Content
In considering any DMCA reforms, Congress should consider not only
the implications for competition and innovation in the U.S.-based internet
sector, but also the interests of scholars and other researchers who are now
widely posting their research online on an open access basis and the millions of user-creators and their audiences who rely on the services that ISPs
193
provide.
In proposing to refashion the safe harbors to give much greater protection to copyright industries, the Section 512 Study gave essentially no
weight to the interests of internet users or to the tremendous creative output
of user-creators. According to a recent report, almost 312 million U.S. resi194
dents are internet users and almost 70% of them use social networks of

day’s internet is largely an outgrowth of the much-reviled [DMCA] that lawmakers passed in
1998 . . . .”); see also Susanna Monseau, Fostering Web 2.0 Innovation: The Role of the Judicial Interpretation of the DMCA Safe Harbors, Secondary Liability and Fair Use, 12 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 70, 106 (2012) (citation omitted) (“The extraordinary and
unprecedented growth in innovative Internet services is only possible because of the
DMCA.”).
192.
See also Copyright in Foreign Jurisdictions Hearing, supra note 3, at 2 (Julia Reda,
Former Member of the European Parliament & Fellow, Berkman Klein Center for Internet &
Society, Harvard University) (describing the primary objective of Article 17 as encouraging
improved licensing for rightsholders).
193.
See DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 2–3 (statement of
David Hansen, Lead Copyright & Information Policy Officer, Duke University); DMCA’s
Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra, at 3–5 (statement of Abigail Rives, IP Counsel, Engine).
194.
J. Clement, Number of Internet Users in the United States from 2000 to 2019,
STATISTA (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/276445/number-of-internet-usersin-the-united-states. As a consequence of the coronavirus pandemic, these figures on internet
usage may well be even more substantial.
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195

various kinds. UGC on these networks have prodigiously proliferated to
196
become a hallmark of the digital age. Most of the UGC uploaded to social
media sites are wholly original creations of the uploaders, including their
photographs of sunsets and videos of cats and dogs. Remixes and mashups
typically draw upon existing works, transforming them so as to convey a
197
different message. Millions of user-creators have been able to commercialize their products with the aid of ISP hosting sites. In 2017, “nearly 17
million Americans earned a collective $6.8 billion in income by posting
198
their personal creations on nine internet platforms.” Etsy, for instance, at
the end of 2019 had almost 65 million items for sale, with 2.5 million active
199
sellers and 45.7 million active buyers. The authors of these works are every bit as deserving of copyright protection as the authors of Hollywood
movies, top-selling sound recordings, and best-selling novels. The Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study did not even acknowledge that UGC creators’ interests in making their works available through online sharing platforms should be taken into account as part of the overall balance.
A staggering number of UGC videos are uploaded to YouTube and
200
photographs to Instagram every day. However, many less-well-known
UGC sites also host large quantities of such works. Consider, for instance,
the Organization for Transformative Works. It has more than one million
registered users, hosts more than four million works, and gets an average of
201
1.12 billion page-views per month. Another example is Automattic, the
U.S.-based internet company behind WordPress, Tumblr, and other platforms, which offered the following data when submitting comments to the
Copyright Office for its § 512 study: in one month in 2016, WordPress users
created more than one million new websites, made 17 million blog posts,

195.
J. Clement, Number of Social Network Users in the United States from 2017 to
2023, STATISTA (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/278409/number-of-socialnetwork-users-in-the-united-states (forecasting based on 2017–18 survey).
196.
See, e.g., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, WHITE PAPER ON
REMIXES, FIRST SALE, AND STATUTORY DAMAGES 6 (2016), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files
/ntia/publications/white_paper_remixes-first_sale-statutory_damages_jan_2016.pdf.
Stakeholders have different perspectives on remixes and mashups. Id. at 6–9.
197.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN
THE HYBRID ECONOMY 14 (2008).
198.
DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 4 (statement of Abigail
Rives, IP Counsel, Engine).
199.
See id.
200.
See, e.g., Mitja Rutnik, YouTube in Numbers, ANDROID AUTHORITY (Aug. 11,
2019), https://www.androidauthority.com/youtube-stats-1016070 (reporting that more than
500 hours of content is uploaded to YouTube every minute); Instagram by the Numbers,
OMNICORE (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.omnicoreagency.com/instagram-statistics (reporting
that more than 100 million photos and videos are uploaded to Instagram every day).
201.
DMCA at 22 Hearing, supra note 16, at 1 (statement of Rebecca Tushnet, Professor
of Law, Harvard University).
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202

and uploaded more than 34 million individual media files. The creators of
these works are authors within the meaning of U.S. copyright law, and a
great many of them have decided to share their works with others under
203
Creative Commons (CC) or similar licenses. Indeed, Creative Commons,
in its State of the Commons 2017 report, claimed 1.4 billion works of au204
thorship were covered by CC licenses.
Insofar as members of Congress consider revisiting the DMCA safe
harbors for online hosting ISPs, they should give due consideration to the
interests of these creators, the audiences these creators are reaching, and
U.S. leadership in the internet and technology industries, as well as the interests of major copyright industry firms. Maintaining a reasonable balance
among these various interests is essential if any copyright reform is to be
politically feasible, let alone wise.
Another failure of the Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study lies in its
ignoring that U.S.-based copyright industries have been thriving in the in205
ternet age. The Study mostly sympathized with content industries’ characterization of the current state of copyright as primarily one of massive harm,
without weighing the tremendous extent of creative innovation made possible in the digital age. While online infringement remains a real problem at
scale, especially from offshore streaming sites, it is undeniable that there is
an immensely greater availability of legitimate online content today via
online streaming and download services as compared with 1998. These services have drawn large audiences of subscribers in the United States and
abroad.
An important early step in this direction was Apple’s deal with the recording industry to license digital music for its iTunes service so that consumers who wanted to lawfully acquire music could do so conveniently and
206
at a modest price-point. Spotify, Pandora, and TIDAL are among the enti-

202.
Automattic Inc., Comment Letter on U.S. Copyright Office Section 512 Study at 2
(Apr. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Automattic Comments] http://copyright.gov/policy/section512. In
that period, Wordpress.com received 541 notices of claimed infringement, to which it strives
to respond within 48 hours. Id.
203.
See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 197, at 17, 227.
204.
Ryan Merkley, A Transformative Year: State of the Commons 2017, CREATIVE
COMMONS (May 8, 2018), https://creativecommons.org/2018/05/08/state-of-the-commons2017.
205.
See generally, JOEL WALDFOGEL, DIGITAL RENAISSANCE (2019). The book’s economic forecasts must be somewhat discounted, as they predate the onset of the coronavirus
pandemic.
206.
See, e.g., Steve Knopper, iTunes’ 10th Anniversary: How Steve Jobs Turned the
Industry Upside Down, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 26, 2013), https://www.rollingstone.com
/culture/culture-news/itunes-10th-anniversary-how-steve-jobs-turned-the-industry-upsidedown-68985.
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ties that have subsequently obtained licenses to popular recorded music.
Spotify, for example, touts 271 million active monthly users, 124 million of
208
whom pay for the service. Amazon and Sirius XM also provide members
of the public with access to millions of songs for modest subscription
209
fees. The upshot is that hundreds of millions of users now have lawful access to an almost unimaginably rich array of digital music and other content
210
through these new digital services.
Several recent studies have charted the successes of creative industries
that have adopted profitable new business models and ways of making content, both old and new, available on the internet, resulting in a new golden
age of creativity. Indeed, a 2019 report on the state of the entertainment industry concluded that “the internet, as currently structured, has been a creative force. It has helped many more people become creators and to make
money from their creations, and the many industry sectors around ‘copy211
right’ are all seeing the fruits of that now.” Even some content industries
that once were struggling are presently thriving. Although newspapers, especially local news publications, may be an exception to the overall trend,
their decline is not due to rampant copyright infringement.
Like the music industry, other entertainment sectors are experiencing
success with new digital content in addition to traditional forms of production and distribution, with growing or steady employment in these sectors as
well. For example, film, television, and streaming video, including UGC,
are benefiting from significant expansions in investment, content creation,
and consumer consumption and spending, particularly as the numbers of
212
cord-cutting video streaming subscribers continues to grow. The market
for books, e-books, and audiobooks has been growing at a steady pace,

207.
See, e.g., Craig Grannell, A History of Music Streaming, DYNAUDIO (May
16, 2018), https://www.dynaudio.com/dynaudio-academy/2018/may/a-history-of-musicstreaming.
208.
Company Info, SPOTIFY, https://newsroom.spotify.com/company-info (last visited
Mar. 07, 2021).
209.
See, e.g., Sarah Perez, Paid Streaming Music Subscriptions in US Top 60 Million,
Says RIAA, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 6, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/06/paid-streamingmusic-subscriptions-in-u-s-top-60m-says-riaa.
210.
See, e.g., IFPI Global Music Report 2019, IFPI (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.ifpi.org
/news/IFPI-GLOBAL-MUSIC-REPORT-2019 (reporting global recorded music revenues up
9.7% over the previous year, streaming revenues up 34%, and paid subscription revenues up
almost 33%). See also Copyright in Foreign Jurisdictions Hearing, supra note 3, at 2–3
(statement of Matt Schruers, President, Computer & Communications Industry Association).
211.
MICHAEL MASNICK & LEIGH BEADON, THE SKY IS RISING: A DETAILED LOOK AT
THE STATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 41–42 (2019), https://skyisrising.com
/TheSkyIsRising2019.pdf; see also DMCA at 22 Hearing, supra note 16, at 4–5 (statement of
Rebecca Tushnet, Professor of Law, Harvard University) (citing statistics from the Masnick &
Beadon study, id.).
212.
MASNICK & BEADON, supra note 211, at 13–24.
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213

along with a big increase in self-publishing. The video game sector, which
includes mobile gaming, live game streaming, and e-sports, is rapidly ex214
panding with no signs of slowing.
Economist Joel Waldfogel’s study of the impact of digitization on crea215
tive industries looked at sales and other data from the previous decade.
Waldfogel found that digital technology has enabled industries to reduce
production costs for content and distribution while at the same time main216
taining the quality of creative output.
Furthermore, a 2018 WIPO study on creators’ income in the digital age
found that wage trends for creative workers generally outperformed other
sectors, losing less or even gaining a better income position than other
217
workers. It corroborates findings by Waldfogel and others that digitization
218
has lowered content generation costs as well as market entry costs. The
study concludes: “From a policy perspective, these results do not lend support to the idea that creators’ income situation has systematically worsened
with the rise of the internet and its intermediaries, as argued by some com219
mentators in ‘value gap’ discussions.”
This good news for major copyright industries has happened during the
two-plus decades since the DMCA safe harbor regime was enacted.

D. The DMCA Safe Harbors Have Fostered First Amendment Freedoms
Another failing of the Section 512 Study is its dismissive attitude about
ways in which the DMCA safe harbors have promoted freedom of speech
and freedom of expression on the internet. Any reform of the DMCA safe
harbors should weigh heavily the public interests in First Amendment freedoms that online hosting ISPs have enabled. In its Comment to the Copyright Office in connection with its § 512 study, Automattic observed:
Safe harbor from allegations of infringement arising out of materials posted by others is foundational to the Internet as we know it.
As the Supreme Court explained in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the Internet democratizes access
to speech by allowing every user to speak to—and be heard by—
every other connected user:

213.
Id. at 25–31.
214.
Id. at 32–40.
215.
WALDFOGEL, supra note 205.
216.
Id. at 252–53; see also MASNICK & BEADON, supra note 211, at 7, 12.
217.
Alexander Cuntz, Creators’ Income Situation in the Digital Age 46 (WIPO, Economic Research Working Paper No. 49, 2018), http://www.lisdatacenter.org/wps/liswps
/755.pdf.
218.
Id.
219.
Id.
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Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line
can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than
it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail
exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a
pamphleteer.
Id. at 870 (citation omitted). That democratization would simply be
impossible if all content had to be checked for copyright infringement before it was posted—which would be the ultimate result if
220
there were no safe harbors.
Changes to the DMCA safe harbor rules should be crafted to promote,
not to restrain or impede, freedom of speech, expression, and assembly,
which are essential components of the democratic principles that define the
United States as a nation.

Conclusion
Congress should be wary of any changes to the current DMCA safe
harbor rule that could have substantial negative impacts on ISPs, whether
small, medium-sized, or established mega-platforms, in addition to the millions of U.S.-based internet creators whose online content is widely enjoyed
by the hundreds of millions of internet users who are constituents of every
member of Congress. As some relatively small U.S.-based internet platforms stated in a letter to members of the EU Parliament about the DSM Directive’s proposals, “[a]ny reform of copyright laws must consider the impact it will have on small internet platforms like ours and the creators that
221
depend on us.”
U.S. internet policy has been and should continue to be pro-competitive
and pro-innovation. It has been the policy of every administration, both Republican and Democratic, that the DMCA notice-and-takedown rules promote the welfare of U.S. industries and internet users. This is why these
administrations have also exported these rules to other countries. The United States should aim to retain its leadership in the global arena in the development of sound copyright law and policy in the digital era, not cede it to
EU policymakers who have formulated such a flawed regime as Article 17.
The Copyright Office had the opportunity to present a neutral, wellbalanced perspective on the current state of ISP copyright liability rules, but

220.
Automattic Comments, supra note 202, at 1; see also Sag, supra note 92, at 518
(discussing the democratizing effect of an open internet on expression and creativity).
221.
Letter from Online Creator Platforms on Article 13, ENGINE (Sept. 10, 2018),
https://www.engine.is/news/category/creatorplatformsarticle13 (letter sent to Member of the
European Parliament on behalf of Automattic, Bandcamp, Kickstarter, Medium, Patreon, and
Shapeways regarding the precursor to Article 17).
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it failed to do so. Instead, it focused too narrowly on the complaints of copyright industries about ISPs at the expense of user-creators and the greater
public interest. Congress should not forget that only by retaining a balanced
perspective including the interests of all relevant stakeholders and upholding fundamental freedoms can U.S. copyright legislation adhere to its constitutional mandate to promote the “progress of Science” in the digital age.

